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The rise and rise of the cluster if not indeed
galaxy of concepts around information, computation
and computability, such as analog/digital, (software)
program/hardware, information-processing, module/
modularity, (Monte Carlo) simulation, binary coding,
bits (binary digits), algorithm, networks, virtual,
clone, code, interface, machine language, computer
memory, cybernetic notions like feedback, feedback
loops, feedback control, and the like (with a number
of roots like cyber, tele-, net- , e- , i-, a-, as prefixes
for an ever-increasing number of new words, in
technical and general use, either with physical
referents or purely figurative) is a central feature
of the world story of the last sixty years or so. These
concepts and their “families” have come to occupy
increasingly dominant and resonant positions in the
sciences and technologies, through vigorous long-
running research programmmes, refashioning,
integrating or synergizing a great variety of
technologies, as much in the realm of our imaginative
life as of our material practices, not forgetting the
key domains of law and medicine, throughout today’s
world, is undoubtedly one of the most remarkable
surges of great concept-clusters in recent history. I
am not sure whether we have fully entered the age
of “universal cyberspeak”1, but, together with
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“market-speak” (the precepts, concepts, specific
tropes and set phrases of market economics,
accounting and management) it has spread, and will
doubtles go on spreading for some time yet,
throughout our social world and our globus
intellectualis.
Given its ubiquity today, the recency of the
Information Galaxy is astonishing, since Shannon’s
information concept/theory dates only from the
1940s, and one is surprised that no-one appears to
have suggested a periodization of world history in
terms of B.S. and A. S. (Before Shannon; After
Shannon) or B. IT and A.IT, before and after the
advent of the informationalization process now
sweeping economy, society, war machines, the
“mode of (scientific) knowledge production”, and
as knowledge is increasingly not only capital (the
concept of “capitalization of knowledge” was
formulated, at least in these terms, not by a Marxist,
but by liberal economists) but an increasingly
important strand of total capital, the overall mode
of production as it obtains today could be labelled
the “informational  mode of production”, so to speak,
or “digital capitalism”, as many writers have already
argued. To be sure, key conceptual and operational
elements or forerunners of these developments are
much older, of course2, though in overall terms one
may call it a novum with a reasonable degree of
prima facie justification. In any case this concept,
or its reflections and cognates, an array of concepts
bearing some degree of apparent or contrived
family-likeness, together with the indispensable array
of associated concepts/tropes/icons as noted, in what
one may call the informational constellation, has
come to pervade, nominally or substantially,
contemporary thought or contemporary discourse
in every domain. Under its aegis, extraordinary
transformations have been taking place and/or are
still in process in every phase of contemporary
economic enterprise from the micro-level to the
globalization processes, financial and productive, so
salient in our age, though not unprecedented in kind,
or even, until recently in proportionate scale
(“Information rules!”), entertainment (“info-
tainment” in more senses than the one originally
envisaged, or “image-engineering”), education
(“edutainment” or “infotainment” too), science
(“infoscience”) and technology (“infotech”). Thanks
in part to the very commonalities, convergences,
synergies and reticularities of IT or ICT (information
and communication technologies) and information
discourse in its widest range, these domains overlap
and interpenetrate in ever more extensive techno-
conceptual ways, so that, in many ways, it is
becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish sharply
and unambiguously between almost any pair of
proceedings within this list: science, engineering,
commerce, finance, production, marketing and
entertainment, even if we should  want to anymore.
It commands contemporary debates concerning
technology, and indeed the control, design, production
and potentiation of all other varieties of technology
(and of itself), which renders the technology of
information and computation a kind of meta-
technology, the first-ever. Under its banner, great
research programmes have been in process for
several decades, constantly renewed despite notable
impasses, periods of stagnation and the recurrent
defeat of public forecasts, such as the robotic, the
Artificial Intelligence, nanotech/atomtech or
quantum computation ones, as well as more strictly
“scientific” research programmes (to resort to an
increasingly obsolete terminology) in Artificial Life
and other lesser ones.  Information technologies (ITs)
or information and communication technologies
(ICTs), have increasingly shaped the post-industrial
or ultra-industrial economy, or the New Economy
where “information rules” (though it is easy to
exaggerate the direct role of the more advanced
technology in wealth-generation, as the much-cited,
The Metaphysics of Information
167RES-PUBLICA
baffling paradox of the near-invisibility of the
computer revolution’s impact in national income
accounts in the US, until very recently, shows3).
More specifically, one should list the bioinformatic
industrialization of genes, genomes, organisms, the
opening of new horizons in the technogenic shaping
or industrialization of intelligence (creating for the
first time non-biological intelligence, that in itself a
novum in which many have seen something of
transcendent import, now available in an endless
stream of varieties and potencies), of mind
(neuroscience is surely pregnant with neuroengineering,
in association with IT creations such as magnetic
resonance imaging), of consciousness (as yet
incipient, except insofar as the mass media exercise
McLuhanite effects, or resonances, but
consciousness engineering would seem to be
implicated in neurocom-putational science), persons
(some info-projects have been named as “building
the Artificial Person”, a kind of techno-Leviathan4),
the environment (a “Third Nature” supervening on
the second nature which earlier technogenic
transformations have brought about, or what
Moscovici called the “cybernetic state of nature”
some decades ago5), jurisprudence, medicine, the
current prospects for natural life and evolution, and,
increasingly, in more direct fashion, for humanity
itself. Theologians are aware that they have not yet
entirely taken on board the implications of the
Information Age, even in the case of the “theology
of  creation”, the school of Catholic social doctrine
most sympathetic to capitalism in its present
technocapitalist, or infotechnocapitalist, incarnation
(“creation” in the name of the school subsuming,
and indeed privileging, “wealth-creation” by
entrepreneurs), but in any case, whatever the
failings of theologians, the informational constellation
has  been bought to bear on key issues of natural
theology to the extent that in effect there has been
a kind of renaissance of “physico-theology”,
especially through information/digital physics and
speculation on the extreme possibilities of computer
technology (simulation via infinite information-
processing) and the rebirth of “physical eschatology”
(Freeman Dyson).
The impact on all the contemporary arts, at any
rate in the West and in Japan, but to some degree
everywhere, direct or indirect, is plain: much of what
goes on in the arts, whether the plastic arts,
performance arts or music, pop or non-pop, folk or
non-folk, can be seen as “experimenting” ever more
indulgently with the new technical possibilities of
audiovisual media and subjects, exploring the
ideational implications of the technologies, and
commenting endlessly on them, and the forms of
life around them or the worldhood they define,
bearing in mind that in much contemporary art the
work and the aesthetic metacommentary have
become practically one, and the boundaries of what
were once called the fine arts and what one might
call technoludics6 dissipated (too early perhaps to
assess genetic art, artificial life art, and the like).
Curiously, the philosophical issues raised by work
in virtual reality (in part a realm of technoludics),
more than the issues raised by say computational
theories of mind or organic life, or by information-
centred approaches in any field of the sciences, that
have been perhaps the ones that most strikingly
engaged discussion and controversy of an openly
metaphysical kind. The saliency of these issues may
illustrate Whitehead’s famous dictum, that
philosophy is (still) a series of footnotes to Plato, or
it may stem from the shameful insight that we were
still “Platonists” at heart. In any case in the
metaphysics (or theology) of virtual reality the central
question is perhaps whether a “virtual realism”, a
somewhat paradoxical realism concerning virtual
reality, is defensible. In the (real) world at large,
Virtual Reality may have become a kind of
transmission belt for an inverted “Platonism for the
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masses”, to borrow the accusation which Nietzsche
famously levelled at Christianity (though Thomism
surely was Aristotelianism for the Christian elites,
though admittedly with a goodly admixture of
Platonism), if not the “opium of the people”7, in
addition, it is true, to the worldwide cornucopia of
opiates prodigiously available today, in legal and
illegal markets, chemical or electronic, for both
masses and elites.
But one may also argue that it may be seen as
the “opium of the intellectuals”8 one way or another,
and even, one might venture to say, the opium of
the scientists in their obsessively simulational
scientific practice and monomaniacal informational
philosophising. Some live off, others live for, still
others live in, or want to live in, partial or even total
immersion in Virtual Reality: considering the amount
of philosophical or sociological writing on VR, it is
plain that an increasing number of people do live
off, or live connected to VR one way or another….
Should we, as Virilio claims, acknowledge that there
has come into being thereby a third ontological level
beyond essence and appearance, the tertium being
here the “trans-appearance” precipitated by VR?.
This is certainly an intriguing suggestion, one of
several very striking, far-reaching claims which
have been advanced in the new domain of the
metaphysics of virtual reality. The most discussed
variant of the contemporary version of physico-
theology, naturally computational, so Artificial
Physico-Theology rather than a branch of natural
theology in the old fashioned sense, is debating
whether perhaps eternal life, the resurrection,
immortality, belong in the realm of virtual reality, or
there too (if there are sciences of the artificial in
the strict sense of “science” there are also appearing,
as in this example, wisssenschaften of the artificial,
“sciences” of the artificial in the broad sense of
“science”, or, if you like, “humanities of the
artificial”, of the digital, of the virtual).
There is no discipline in any branch of science,
mathematics, natural science, social science, human
science, descriptive, experimental or theoretical,
qualitative or quantitative, that has not been affected
at various levels of instrumentality, conceptua-
lization, model-building, in the choice of heuristic or
ontological metaphors9, and the direction of
research, in some cases quite profoundly and
decisively by the informational computational
constellation. In some areas, the impact is still limited:
cybernetic political science has not come to dominate
the field, or even assume major importance as yet,
despite the early start with Karl Deutsch’s treatise10,
for instance, and the same is true of the Artificial
Societies research programme (“AS”, after all, is
not yet a generally recognized acronym) or even of
Artificial Economies. But all in all we may be
witnessing a process that could eventually transform
to some degree the whole of scientific knowledge
or knowledge-production, a pan-scientific revolution,
as well as every facet of engineering11. Indeed, on
current trends, every science that really counts, with
honourable exceptions, will not only be the basis of,
but interchangeable with a branch of engineering,
as already happened with some branches of the life-
sciences, and may be imminent in neuroscience12.
With the advances in artificial, computational, digital
sciences and of the concomitant engineering in
simulation and in material practices, not only every
branch of science, but every branch of learning, all
“wissenschaften”, instead of aspiring to the
condition of mathematics or of physics (the famous
syndrome of “physics envy”, and the uneasy feeling
that science is either physics or “stamp-collecting”,
in the famous phrase of the physicist Rutherford),
as appears to have been the case until recently, will
now aspire to the status of a branch of
engineering13. In any case, inspired by current
technocapitalism14, already economic, social,
cultural and political history in every western country
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going back at least to the eighteenth century, is being
rewritten from the perspective of the role of
engineers and engineering, in a literal sense of these
terms, though sometimes in a more relaxed sense,
and no doubt this trend will continue for some time
to come.15
Many commentators have already designated
computer simulation research as a “third kind of
science”, in addition to if not virtually supplanting in
some cases, the old-style theoretical and physical-
experimental types of scientific work (not to mention
natural-historical knowledge in the sciences of life
and the earth). H. Simon (a Nobel Laureate in
economics, though more a remarkable inter-
disciplinary scholar than an economist), a leader in
the computational research programme of AI,
through good and bad times, advanced the concept
of the “sciences of the artificial”, but one may well
ask whether we any longer have natural sciences,
“sciences of the natural”, partly because “natural
nature” in contradistinction to technogenic or
anthropogenic nature, “artificial nature” (Sorel) is
receding, partly because observational or natural-
historical knowledge has been depreciated or lost
(like artisan or craft knowledge and all sorts of
culinary skills, the depreciation of experiential
knowledge being the subject of adverse comment
even by professors of engineering), partly because
simulation research has artificialized large sectors
of the natural sciences in a new way (consider only
the recently developed Artificial Ethology, the
development of robots to mimic a great variety of
animal functions and capacities, with a view to
profiting technologically from the modes of operation
elicited, or Synthetic Ethology, the simulation study
of virtual animals, both which bear the name of one
of the most observation-intensive, “field” disciplines
of the life-sciences). At any rate, in addition to the
sciences of natural beings, we now have sciences
of artificial (digital) beings, whether they be artificial
or virtual organisms (“digital biology”16), artificial
intelligences, artificial brains (on the way to a super-
brain), artificial persons (programatically at least)
and indeed also a “digital physics”, though, for once,
physics did not lead the way in the procession of
digital sciences, the first chronologically and
certainly in baptismal terms, being artificial
intelligence, though it is reassuring to find that the
usual “cultural lag” obtains inasmuch as Artificial
Economics and even more Artificial Sociology (still
in its earliest infancy) don’t compare yet in their
level of development with these fields. In a more
fundamental sense, the engineer17, philosopher and
armchair revolutionary Georges Sorel had already
argued forcefully a century ago that modern
experimental science, in contrast to “natural
philosophy”, or “natural history”,  investigates not
“natural nature”, nature “in the wild”, but “artificial
nature” prepared for controlled laboratory conditions
(in this analysis preceding and clearly influencing
Bachelard); today, nature-simulation, and the
engineering of virtual beings, has added a new
technoscientific mode of artificiality, and all natural
sciences are now truly “sciences of the artificial”,
in one or more of the major senses of the term
“artificial”18, sometimes in several or perhaps all
senses, conjointly, including that of being “digital
sciences”, as we already have a digital physics, a
digital chemistry, a digital biology, a digital science
of  organic and non-organic intelligence (of mind,
of consciousness), and indeed a digital geology and
a digital geography 19. Perhaps one might say that
the natural sciences proper are sciences of
“computation in the wild” (as the phrase goes), that
is to say the computation that takes place in natural
beings in their pristine pre-cyborg state (in their
meatware or fleshware20), including not only la
pensée sauvage, but also la pensée apprivoisée
of the very practicioners of the sciences21, whilst
the artificial sciences are sciences of the computation
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directly engineered by us. Yet some of the eventual
momentous outcomes of such computational
engineering (AI, AL), with a dash of Darwinian
evolution, are not expected to remain under our
control, or within the confines of our understanding
(the very point is that they will surpass our cognitive
capacities), so these  will be also, in a way, “wild”
too, and that is the point of it, that is the beauty of it,
the terrible beauty, some might say, or, better, the
sublimity of what is to come (beyond the received
versions of the “technological sublime”).
A bold scientist has proclaimed, in a recent self-
published 1,200 page bestseller, the advent of a
computation-inspired “new kind of science”, a
science of rules rather than laws, as the dominant
style of scientific knowledge-production, though it
is not clear whether the author, the computer
scientist Stephen Wolfram (creator of the software
program Mathematica) will ever gain the accolade
of a new Bacon, the herald of a scientific revolution,
he may certainly be seen as one of the leaders
promoting a cybernetic monoculture of the scientific
mind. Wolfram has certainly made the most of the
methodological lessons to be gained from cellular
automata (first promoted by the mathematician von
Neumann, whose legacy comprises many superb,
yet poisoned, gifts), the virtual entities that have
arisen in the prosecution of the Artificial Life
programme: how with simple rules working on
simple relationships, your programs can generate
extraordinary complexity. Conversely, he holds that
all processes, however complex, whether arising
spontaneously in nature or through human
intervention, may be seen as the final result of the
application of simple initial rules. However, contrary
to the excesses of scientism, he does argue that
this complexity may be in some cases,  unmasterable
by current science, or what he calls “computational
irreducibility”: even if completely generated by
definite simple rules there is no way, even in principle,
to understand the system until the program is run
(until it is all over, or until the end of time). Free will
in humans would be a case in point: our actions
cannot be predicted before they happen though if
accurate prediction is impossible, even in principle22,
this does not negate the principle that such systems
as humans are instances of deterministic systems
(Ed Fredkin, physicist, inventor, successful
entrepreneur, MIT academic, had advanced
analogous views about the wide epistemological
import of cellular automata and simple rules as
generators of the most extraordinary complexity,
much earlier, but he concentrated exclusively on
physics, and did not set forth his views in a grand
manifesto).23
Not only is the production of scientific knowledge
increasingly simulational, science in silico, but the
very subject of the production of scientific
knowledge in general, and not only under present
technological circumstances, the concern of
metascientific inquiries of a computational and
simulational kind. “Simulating science” is a cognitive
enterprise of note: metascience itself strives to
become a cyber-discipline, with its research into
inductive “Bacon24 machines” and other epistemic
digital machines, promoted by H. Simon, among
others, easier perhaps now that so much science is
not only latently, but overtly, computational to an
increasing degree25. Cyber-science is a natural topic
for simulating science, or meta-cyberscience, but
all scientific knowledge, such as Newtonian physics,
falls within the domain of meta-cybercience or the
computational philosophy of science. It is not just a
matter of providing a rational reconstruction of past
scientific knowledge in terms of inductive inference,
deductive inferece or more recenty of abductive or
retroductive inference (in Peirce´s sesne). It has
also become a programme for advancing scientific
knowledge today. Recently the periodical Nature
published a paper on what the authors called the
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“robot scientist”, the isue of a combination of work
on Artificial Intelligence in discovery software, or
“machine learning” and on robotics, which can
perform genetic analyses (in this case, the function
of specific yeast genes), as accurately and
effectively as a human and more cost-effectively
than human scientists26. The automated system,
once fed data (as a human readinga rticles on a
given topic), originates hypotheses, devises
experiments to test the hypotheses, runs the
experiments on its associated lab robot, interprets
the results as rebutting or corroborating the
hypotheses, and restarts the cycle in the former case.
According to the authors (and the editors of the
journal concur), this may be a significant step twards
the automation of some phases of scientific work,
enabling at least many tasks of graduate students,
research assistants, postdocs, be performed by
“intelligent” scientific knowledge-producing robots.
An editorial in Nature, in the same issue,
commenting on the article in question, drew an
analogy with the history of clerical labour in the
service sector: with the mechanization of routine
laboratory tasks, apprentice scientists will be freed
for more creative tasks, allowing more time and
energy to make the “high-level creative leaps at
which they excel”. This is perhaps a not very
cheering analogy, since the historical record on the
trials of clerical labour is very mixed indeed, though
unwittingly perhaps their remarks suggest the need
for a theory of the scientific labour process to
complement the existing “theory of the labour
process” elaborated for the industrial and non-
scientific service sector: there is so much literature
on knowledge-capital, on the capitalization of
knowledge, on property rights for scientific invention
that it would be pleasing if scientific labour (oddly
invisible in the literature referred to, and indeed in
much history, sociology or philosophy of science,
the category itself altogether absent), not scientific
capital, could be taken into account in a theoretical
fashion. After all, the authors point out  that the
robot scientists or SciBots “can work all day and all
night without labour costs” (this might be welcome
too as saving time and money in drug development).
Where will the process of mechanization of the
scientific labour process, “the freeing of
brainpower” end? Clearly, the automated science
lab looms ahead, and, accordingly, the drive for
“downsizing” in the ever-more capitalized, robotized,
Automated Market University27 may pick up speed.
Meta(cyber)science is construed as simulating
science (a computational study of scientific
knowledge production); cyber-science is by
definition simulational; cyberscience simulates
nature; nature, or rather the physical world in its
entirety, at the quantum lvel, too, is, according to
some physicists, like Ed Fredkin, J. A. Wheeler or
S. Wolfram, itself a simulation or a computer
program (not The One and Only World Program,
but just a world program, one of the infinitely many
that could have been run, and not the most
necessarily the most elegant: the author of the
actually existing, or actually running, world program
could have done better, according to Fredkin- but
how do we know until it is run in full?). Given these
premisses, we may conclude that, on these terms,
presumably, any and every scientific simulation is,
necessarily, at least a simulation of a simulation, if
not a simulation of a simulation of a simulation, and
so on … Artificial or cyber-metascience is certainly
a simulation of a simulation in the case of the
cybersciences.
Philosophy itself, not least philosophy in the
analytical styles, has now taken to computers and
the Internet, replacing the Socratic dialogue and the
live face to face seminar or tutorial by the new
forums of electronic comunication, and may even
become a cyber-discipline in other and perhaps more
consequential senses as well, through systematic
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reflection on cyber-science, on simulating science
and the computational universe. In the current wave
of technological enthusiasm fuelled above all by IT
or ICT and its cognates, philosophy in practice has
come to be characterized by some distinguished
practicioners as a mode of engineering: so much
for dialogicality, dialectic, hermeneutics, rhetoric,
logic, synoptic ambition, aiming at “rigorous
science”, and other such concerns of recent
philosophy…One might argue that in a technological
civilization we need philosophy of engineering, not
least the epistemology of engineering, and the
epistemology of the the implementation of
engineering in the real world of risk and uncertainty,
as well as a critical inquiry into Artificial Science28.
We need a critique of technological civilization, a
critique of technoscientific reason, a critique of the
technogenic world. Instead, we now have a proposal
to turn philosophy into engineering, or reclassifying
philosophy (as is now being done by some
practicioners), whose etymology means the love of
knowledge, as engineering (though not to be
confused with the “knowledge engineering” in the
field of “expert systems” which have been playing
a substantial role in law and medicine), or a “science
of the artificial”, or another Artificial discipline or
wissenschaft, Artificial Philosophy. It might be more
relevant to turn engineers into philosophers, though
it is true that a number of engineers since the early
nineteenth century have developed significant
philosophical views about the role and cultural import
of technology. It has been claimed that such
engineer-formulated philosophies of technology
have been more optimistic, at least on the whole,
than those works by such philosophers or other
humanists that have addressed the questions
concerning technology and technological civilization,
but in fact this has not always been so, and at any
rate many of them have been demonstrably aware
of the profound ambiguities of the historic role in
national or planetary terms of actually existing,
effectively embodied, technologies (their
technological optimism, when present, has often
been associated with religious backgrounds,
commitments and visions, and not just with secular
concerns, or as the result of a  purely secular or
formally secularized technological utopianism). Even
those, like Spengler, who enjoined their countrymen
to become engineers rather than poets or thinkers
(in a direct attack on the German self-image of a
nation of Dichter und Denker) were not
necessarily, by any means, cosmic optimists or
expecting universal well-being to arise thereby, let
alone salvation, to put it mildly. The engineers in
Weimar and Nazi Germany who embraced
reactionary modernism, the pursuit of technology in
the aid of power and the master-race, and who
believed in a deep congruence between the two,
the “reactionary modernists” as characterized by
J. Herf, illustrate the point that technological
optimism of engineers could be very perverse. The
most important philosopher (in the general judgment
in Anglophone countries particularly, though some
would demur) of the twentieth century with a
background in engineering, specifically in
aeronautical engineering, Wittgenstein, though he did
not develop a philosophy of technology (though
recently some of his followers have pursued the
critique of the programmes and claims of Artificial
Intelligence), was by no means intoxicated with the
progress of technological civilization, even if he
cannot be labelled a pure case of “cultural
pessimism”.
We may sum up a first overall impression of the
changed map of the globus intellectualis that we
face today in two crisp sentences coined within the
last fifteen years or so by two very different
American scholars. “Information is everything”,
according to a sociologist and student of Lacan,
much concerned with the psychoanalysis of
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computer use and organizational dynamics in the
economy and not only (Sherry Turkle). “Everything
is information”: so have proclaimed many
exponents of the technologies and metaphysic of
information, including the mathematician,
speculative thinker and science fiction writer Ruddy
Rucker29 (or, in the genre of ontological maxims
popularized by Quine, “to be [something] is to be
information, or informatizable). This palindromic
informationalism, as we may call it (“everything is
information” =”information is everything”), sums up,
in two interconvertible slogans, that it would be an
exaggeration to claim but perhaps not by very much,
the  dominant, or the hegemonic, self-image of the
age (though not entirely perhaps that of the actual
hegemon of the times).
Be that as it may, the word “information” is
everywhere currently and this prestigeful ubiquity
in the sciences and in science fiction (literary or
cinematic), amongst the cybernauts and among the
laity, warrants the title that the American theorist of
rhetoric, and of sociey as rhetoric, Kenneth Burke
ascribed in quite other contexts, in the age of warring
ideologies, a “god term”, and the cluster of associated
concepts enjoys the status of a pantheon of auxiliary
deities (or “auxiliary god terms”) in this
constellation. The world itself has been most
economically summed up by a major contemporary
theoretical physicist, J. A. Wheeler, in a compact
string of four monosyllables: “It is a bit” (one may
see this as sentence as the latest counterpart to the
even more laconic biblical phrase Fiat lux, the Latin
being shorter of course, through the resources of
the language). Or, as another commentator has put
it, “if (…) matter is essentially quantum [and of
course it is], then matter is information [italics
added]” or, “[t]he new primordial substance: not
matter but information [italics in the original]”: these
are not, admittedly,  statements that one will most
likely find, at least in such blunt terms, in even the
most up to date college-level physics textbooks, but
they testify to the potency of what is perhaps the
favourite or at the very least one of the most
compelling of the prime “ontological metaphors” of
our time concerning the most basic “stuff” of the
world, among the scientifically well-informed and
all those sensitized to technoscientific imagery30
(other metaphors, ontological or not, have
persistently attached themselves to notions of
“information” since 1945, not least that of an
“information waterscape”31,  or what one might call
the topos of oceanic information).
It is not yet a central issue but one must note,
nevertheless, that the concept of information appears
to have assumed parity (or at least approaching it in
the views of some leading physicists) with the
concepts of matter and energy in physics itself –
and that is as “hard” as you can get, science-wise,
surely- whilst the concepts of matter and energy
are quite a bit older. Obviously the concept of
“matter”, although very substantially modified in
every epoch of physical science, is quite ancient by
comparison, and the conceptions of atomism have
had a lasting influence in natural philosophy since
pre-Socratic throught (as well as a long, remarkable,
independent history in Indian thought): the history
of atomistic speculations (or “atomistic intuitions”
as Bachelard put it), or corpuscularianism, critical
to modern science, of matter-theory, or “hyletics”,
to use the term recently revived by Deleuze32, or
“materiology” (F. Dagognet), has naturally been the
subject of extensive inquiries ranging over centuries
and millennia. Even the concept of physical energy,
whilst dating, strictly speaking, in its articulation in
modern guise and acceptance in physical science
from the 1850s (after decades of close engagement
with the theoretical issues raised by the power-
engines of the Industrial Revolution as well, to be
sure, with immanent problems of the physical
sciences qua sciences), and therefore almost a
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century older, has a long pre- or better ante-history,
in the currency of the concept of force in mechanics,
in its constitution in “modern rational science” (Max
Weber’s phrase), even though contested in the
recurrent controversies between the supporters of
the rival schools of mechanicism and dynamism in
natural philosophy, at any rate, a longer history
which has already been related in considerable
detail. Notions of force fields, or of plenist, anti-
atomist intuitions going back to the Stoics, have
provided a recurring counterpoint to atomism, or the
corpusculurian outlook, a striking example of the
alternation of “themata” in Holton’s sense33. In any
case, the basal triad matter-energy-information
appears now entrenched in physical thought, when
even twenty years, certainly thirty years ago this
triad as defining the “stuff” of the physical world
was not part of the common perception of scientists,
whether physicists or others, and most certainly not
of science popularizers (a job often done by ex-
scientists or even intermittently practicing scientists),
for since the twenties at least, reference was made
essentially to the dyad matter-energy, though of
course a great deal was made of the maximum
velocity of signals, the velocity of light. Of course,
at least since the “Maxwell’s demon” thought-
experiment was put forward in the third quarter of
the nineteenth century, the relationships between
energy/entropy and what has come to be known as
“information” have been discussed intermittently by
physicists, at first by classical physicists and later
by quantum physicists in the nineteen twenties.
Nevertheless, the appearance of information theory
in the nineteen fourties suggested a reframing of
the discussion of the seemingly intractable Maxwell
demon paradox and the sense of how to go about
resolving or dissolving it.34
Whatever may be the case in physics, it is
undoubtedly the case, and hardly needs docu-
mentation, that, in the general currency of thought
in our technological civilization, “information” (a term
which we may use from time to time as an
epitomization for the conceptual or perspectival
galaxy indicated) has become so pervasive as to
enjoy the status not just of a leading concept even
one that has become the requisite of an increasing
number of disciplines, but of a category, in something
like the traditional sense of an absolutely
fundamental, indispensable and commanding
concept for systematic rational thought (it is perhaps
a pity that Campanella’s term “primalities” did not
replace “categories”). Thus it appears to enjoy at
least parity with such basal concepts or categories
as space, time, matter, force/energy and the like,
answering such basic queries concerning the loci
or topoi of “where?, when?, why?, how come?,
how much?, to what effect?, to what purpose?, made
of what?”, or exhibited in basic linguistic forms such
as subject-predicate propositions (in Indo-European
languages). As it is now pervading if not saturating
our comonsensical understandings and daily
practices as well as the institutional framework
within which we have to proceed in all our
transactions, it surely counts as a category in the
Durkheim-Mauss sense (borrowed from philosophy,
but most immediately from the neo-kantian critical
rationalism of Renouvier35) as something
overarching in our conceptual frameworks, and
thoroughly implicated in our collective
representations in the way we think and act, and
cannot do otherwise (and indeed implicated in a web
of social sanctions). For Durkheim and his
collaborators, the repertoire of the categories of
human thought appears to be fixed, but the specific
determinations of the categories vary very
substantially across social space and historic times
and various classic papers were written precisely
on these variations, such as Hertz on the privileging
of the right hand as the enactment of social space-
differentiation, Hubert on time-marking as sacred
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or profane, and the religious matrix of temporal
classificatons, Durkheim and Mauss on symbolic
classifications (the conceptual, value-laden,
sanction-bearing cross-classifications of all things
that make up operative cosmologies), and Mauss
on the category of the person.
For Strawson, “our conceptual scheme”, by
which he means “our categorial scheme” which
makes up our common sense world, has no history
36(Oxford philosophers liked to say “we” and “our”
in some all-inclusive, pan-human sense, but this
goodfellowship somehow excluded deviant
Continental European metaphysicians, against whom
they always seemed to be writing, though they have
had their own home-grown deviant metaphysicians,
even in the same city, in the same university). He
did recognize that there have been thinkers whose
systems were clearly at variance with the ones that
supposedly define our common sense, and he called
them “revisionary” or “prescriptive” metaphysicians
(appealing or not to “deviant logics” such as
dialectical logic, para-consistent logics, quantum
logic and so on). However, he did not appear to
concede that in Western civilization our conceptual/
categorial scheme may have undergone shifts at
least in the over-all distribution of emphasis, on the
legitimacy of diverse categories, in their cotenability,
and in the admission of categories which would not
fit in comfortably in the received overarching
conceptual schemes of the epoch or the culture. In
this he appeared wholly at variance with the
“revisionary” proposal of “metaphysics as a historical
science”, enunciated by Collingwood in 1940,
according to which each epoch of thought was
circumscribed by its own “constellation of absolute
presuppositions” (called “absolute” for they are not
explicit premisses of any reconstructible axiomatic
propositional system, and they cannot be articulated
as long as they are operative, as long as they shape
our thinking). Although this is not a topic of
investigation in this paper we may advert that we
do not  subscribe to the categorial immutability thesis
of Strawson nor to the radical incommensurability
or unbridgeability thesis that is all too easy to read,
rightly or wrongly, in Collingwood (for this thinker
we can never, by definition, articulate fully, if at all,
our own Absolute Presuppositions; tht cn only be
done by others, when our epoch is over) 37. We are
closest to the Durkheim-Mauss position of
categories-with-a-history, except that we also
concede the emergence of new categories, for the
stock of categories is not given in advance, nor
indeed a priori, and no attempted transcendental
deduction of the minimum set of irrecusable
categories has ever been successful, though usually
such attempts prove not unilluminating. Today, of
course, we have into account not only cross-cultural
variations and how we may still cleave to the
“epistemological unity of human kind” in the face
of these variations, unless we yield to epsitemo-
logical relativism of a fundamental kind, but also
the problematic of the non-human cognitive,
ratiomorphic or “intelligent” beings, and the
comparisons between human epistemology and
“android epistemology” (a new branch of
comparative epistemology, already supplied with
cllections of readings). Also, this approach tacitly
recognized, in part, the importance of valuations and
valuational hierarchies, and the sanctions attached
thereto, in category-work: a point made forcefully
by Rescher in speaking of “evaluative metaphysics”,
the overall axiology of the world, subsuming the
Augustinian ordo amoris in a wider axial
framework, encompassing non-human concerns and
realms of being38.
At any rate, in these terms, there has been a
veritable large-scale  categorial shift, if not a
“categorial revolution”, in the last few decades,
involving at least the restructuring of the relatively
slow-changing categorial understandings to admit a
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new category or primality. The implications for the
interrelations of the categories of space, time, matter
and energy on the side of the physical sciences we
have already hinted at. The gravest implications,
because they bear more directly on our “natural
attitude” (or “natural stance”) concerning life, stem
from the advent of molecular-informational biology
and bioinformatics generally inasmuch as their turn
towards biological engineering was one that no
discipline in the past managed so quickly and with
such portentous and far-reaching implications (this
may be disputed, of course). We are offered a
curious mix if not a perplexing  alternation, of genetic
determinism and genetic interventionism (therapeutic
or preventive, somatic or germline, in human
subjects, transgenetic new organisms in agriculture,
fisheries and husbandry), or, as it is sometimes put,
“brute genetic determinism” of simply taking the
consequences, and “Promethean genetic
determinism” of manipulating pristine genes and
manufacturing “wonder genes” for our well-being
and our empowerment (for many purposes, such
as eliminating crime and violence, by eradicating its
genetic basis, something which is very often claimed,
despite the startling naïveté). On the one hand, the
judicial-astrological sounding pronouncement by the
geneticist James Watson, co-unlocker of the Code
of Life, that “our fate is not written in the stars, but
in our genes” (fate, not destiny, though destiny would
have been less contentious since destiny can be
assumed in terms opportunities to seize the right
moment, the kairos, for making the best of things,
and fate can only be endured without recourse, fate
can only crush), and on the other, that biotechnology,
by virtue of its access to, and command over, genetic
information particularly, can empower us to change,
to redesign, to reengineer, to reprogram, life-forms,
our vital properties too, consciously and deliberately,
in substantial ways, to “our own” specifications,
under the guidance of qualified “biocrats”, with and
through the market, can induce giddiness on even
the sanest.
Similar developments may yet ensue from the
informational understanding of mind and
consciousness, with  the strain that the implications
which are being drawn and strenuously promulgated
of what is standardly called “eliminative
materialism”, which might be better explicated as
“eliminative ontological materialism”, or radical
physicalism, from the conjunction with neuroscience/
neurotechnology (ever more sophisticated brain
scanning)39, or even the slighly weaker thesis of
epiphenomenalism, which date back to the mid-
nineteenth century, are placing on “folk psychology”,
that is to say, our commonsense conceptual scheme
regarding our mental life, our minds, our personhood,
our basic self-regard, at any rate what I conjecture
to be the prevalent commonsense conceptual
scheme in terms of which we see ourselves as
necessarily, even essentially, creatures of desires
and beliefs (“propositional attitudes”), or in another
lexicon, of intentionality (in the neoscholastic sense
of Brentano of directedeness towards objects,
absent or abstracta, possibly nonexistent, fictional
or logically impossible ones, often regarded as “the
mark of the mental”) and as capable of free
decisions as well as subjects of qualitative
experience or, in the standard terminology, qualia40.
This version of self-designated materialism is of
course much stronger than the most influential
version of materialism in recent times, that of non-
reductionist “emergent materialism”, which
grounded mental life in physical or biological reality
but did not deny its specific features of qualia,
consciousness, even possibly rational volition41.
Of course all these currents of thought also
profess a kind of “eliminative (ontological)
individualism” (that they subscribe or indeed take
for granted methodological individualism, the
dominant strain in contemporary social science in
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any case, goes without saying) inasmuch as they
quite clearly reject, overtly or by implication, any
attribution of ontological status or irreducible
predicates or irreducible  higher-level laws to groups,
collectives, institutions or cultural entities or cultural
wholes. There seems to be a dissonance with the
significant support for ontological holism regarding
social or cultural wholes, social or cultural entities,
in “analytical metaphysics”42, even if the bulk of
sociologists, and other social scientists, seem to have
been intimidated into professing methodological
individualism, which often seems tantamount to
subscribing to ontological individualism as well,
even though it is generally conceded that the
methodological thesis does not entail, or logically
necessitate, its ontological counterpart (or, for that
matter, its political or, more generally, axiological
counterpart), or vice versa,  though they may often
be conflated, and it is of course licit to hold them
together so long as they are kept analytically distinct.
Of course there are approaches to the metaphysic
and methodology of social theory which purport to
be neither individualistic/atomistic nor collectivistic/
holistic, since the “relational realism” of Renouvier
at least43, which is akin to what has been more
recently called “relational holism”, though this Third
Way tends to collapse into one or the other of the
poles of individualism and social holism, just as
methodological individualism often collapses into
reductive psychologism, but in any case this
possibility does not seem to be entertained by the
eliminativists.
The hard science informationalist physicalists
would certainly eschew any hints of the “Objective
Spirit” as anything more than the palest of ghosts in
the  global complex of information-machines-in-the-
Net, though in fact the “netaphysics”, or perhaps
better, the netametaphysics, of Pierre Lévy, may
seem on the verge of bringing the Objective Spirit
back, or at any rate something like it, in an even
earlier incarnation than the Hegelian one, as the
analogy he pursues with the “active intellect”
(intellectus agens) of Aristotle and of Averroes’s
interpretation of Aristotle (“Left Aristotelianism”,
Ernst Bloch called it), makes clear though he is rally
more taken with Avicenna. These alleged
implications also mean the potential subversion of
the category or primality of the person44 (or the
rational being in the Kantian sense, a being endowed
with pure and practical reason) which has been
crucial to liberal democratic civilization and indeed
to the presuppositions of the criminal law and the
imputation of legal and moral responsibility in every
Western society, and to our constitutive self-
understanding as individuals/persons in the epoch
of modernity, of the homo aequalis of late
Occidental civilization, so cherished in all official
discourse of the democracies.
To receive the category of information in the
life-sciences, the human and social sciences, not so
much per se, but rather in the specific way that has
been taking place, carries quite a metaphysical
baggage. For it has come packed together as one
seemingly indivisible whole with the metaphysical
claims typically associated with the information-
pushers, or shall we say, with the information/
computation-centred metaphysical, scientific or
what we may call technological research
programmes (borrowing respectively from Popper
and Lakatos, and extending the Lakatosian approach
to the history of technology) in the ongoing scientific
study of and technological enterprises concerning
life, mind, consciousness and persons. Now it is not
at all clear that we can subscribe to these claims
and still coherently call ourselves committed
members of a liberal civilization based on what
Durkheim called the “cult of the human person”,
the respect for the person (“respect” in the Kantian
sense, as something partaking of awe) for the
sacredness and integrity of the human person, of
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generic personhood, the core of the overarching civil
religion of the national versions of Western civil
religion, underlying and grounding the language of
moral and legal human rights, so pervasive, if not
downright inflationary, in recent decades. At any
rate, we would have to work out how to reconcile
the respective presuppositions and implications, or
perhaps learn how to live in two irreconcilable
worlds, the true one of “scientific materialism”45,
and the illusory one of belief in libertarian free will
and respect for persons (presupposing a positive
ontological status for personhood), which surely
cannot be kept wholly separate in a civilization so
committed both to the pursuit of scientific and
technological advance and also, at the same time,
to the upholding and pursuit of human rights and
liberal democracy.
In informational-computational-cybernetic terms
it has been a regular practice to embark on
“revisionary philosophical anthropology”, challenging
the very idea of personhood, as understood in
anything like a broadly Kantian fashion. Pursuing
these depersonalization goals, or at least outcomes,
it has been proclaimed by distinguished scientists/
mathematicians that “we are all zombies”, “we are
all cyborgs” and “we are all Darwin machines”,
slogans which we will proceed to discuss briefly.
If “we are all zombies”, as the widely-read
informationalist philosopher of mind Daniel Dennett
indefatigably proclaims, enjoining us to lose the
scales of our illusions about ourselves, to see
ourselves as we really are, and cannot be
otherwise46, we cannot be free agents (and indeed
since zombies serve as liminal beings between the
living and the dead, perhaps not agents at all, in the
conventional understanding). Though this exciting
discovery is claimed to flow from cutting-edge
science, we all know that similar implications were
drawn very forcefully, with comparable enthusiasm,
by major schools of experimental psychology at least
since the beginning of the twentieth century and
we have been repeatedly advised to deliver
ourselves of the burden of putative libertarian free
will and self-attributed “dignity” (another Kantian
term) of human beings47, by the teachings of
Pavlovian classical conditioning, Watsonian molar
behaviourism48 and Skinnerian operant conditioning.
All these research programmes were also conceived
as forms of psycho-technological utopianism,
promising to bring about painless large-scale social
reform if indeed not the advent of New Humans,
though the scientific transformation, pedagogic (via
infant- and child-rearing, schooling and training) and
therapeutic, of human beings, conditional on losing
our illusions about freedom, responsibility and dignity,
incompatible with the scientific view of the world.
They were all very well-intentioned, they have all
helped some human beings and ameliorated some
social practices, in limited fashions, as well as being
instruments of power and deceitful persuasion, but
the doctrines or methods would not now be
considered to be endowed with anything like the
cognitive or technical capacity to realize their aims,
despite their confident promises (the point is worth
noting, taking into account Dennett’s fondness for
the word “engineering”, in line with current trends).
“We are all cyborgs” according to the
mathematicians J. Cohen and Ian Stewart in a
recent work, who record this with unmistakable glee,
though perhaps this should be taken not quite literally,
but only proleptically, for it is hard to see ourselves
as already cyborgs, in any strong sense of the term,
with the best will in the world, and as uttered in the
spirit of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Oddly enough,
such claims appear to neglect the actual origin of
the concept of cyborg (for “cybernetic organism”),
invented by two scientists working for NASA as an
alternative to genetic engineering (not a very realistic
possibility for the immediate future at that time,
though already much talked about by geneticists and
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other biologists as a grandiose project that would
be realized on a large scale, and over a wide front,
in a matter of decades), to design modifed humans
that could be fit for space travel and residence in
other planets, literally fit for space not for the Earth,
fit for other worlds, not for this one, not for a richer
life on this planet. If indeed we were all cyborgs
now, we could not also be as human as we still
appear to be to the naked eye, or at least remain
human in any folk anthropological sense that as
prevailed hitherto (there are trivial senses in which
we may be said to be cyborgs at this hour, but the
scholars in question mean more than that: several
persons have claimed to be cyborgs right now, on
the grounds that they have had microchips implanted
in their bodies or their brains49). The process of
cyborgification, of becoming ever more fully cyborgs,
is certainly on, perhaps succeeding the arrested
“process of civilization”, but no cosmic law, no
Supreme Technological Imperative, will compel us
to go through every rung in the ladder of
cyborgification, just as we are not compelled to
follow the process of transgeneticization until we
turn into New Humans, until we attain genuine
complete cyborg status. We are not, to be sure,
compelled by any directional law of evolution (even
if any such things obtained in fact or could obtain in
principle, owing to fundamental empirical
considerations or to conceptual warrants), but the
drift of creeping cyborgification (and what Dewey
called “the fascination of all too easy surrender to
fatality”50) could conceivably bring about the same
result in due course as any “directional law” (M.
Mandelbaum), “functional law” (G. A. Cohen), or
orthogenetic law or trend towards mechanizing
humans. Note that this view, though formally in the
indicative mood, clearly involves a confident
prediction and an impatient expectation that the
mechanization of humans, the tranformation of the
organic human into the inorganic-electronic-
mechanical, is the only way forward for human
beings, and in any case this fate cannot be resisted,
and indeed should not be resisted, to spare us much
pain. They exemplify an important pattern of
argument characteristic of much utopian social
thought, not least in the socialist tradition, but which
in recent years has been most forcefully exhibited
in technological manifestos and the voices of
cyberprophets: it is to treat what is to come, what is
expected to be inevitable, good and most knowledge-
embodying, along a master trajectory of
technological development, as already present in
some essential fashion (so the future will be more
of the same: “we are all cyborgs” now, and in the
future we will be even more so). This is a version
of what Kenneth Burke called the “temporalizing
of essence”, in this case an application of the trope
of prolepsis, a vision of the future as encapsulated
already in the present, and thereby vindicating it.
Some of us remember how the sociologist C. Wright
Mills, writing in the 1960s, savaged the “cheerful
robots” of his time: he did not anticipate the coming
of the “cheerful cyborgs” (no other kind seems to
be contemplated by cyborg enthusiasts, melancholy
cyborgs not being envisaged), let alone that of the
cheerful sirens luring us into the cyborg age, in our
current technological odyssey, ostensibly on the
grounds of its helpfulness in dissolving patriarchy
and like ills51.
We are all merely advanced “Darwin machines”,
or, in other words information-processing
biomachines, subjected to selective pressures,
according to Henry Plotkin (and in some ways this
is straight current orthodoxy). But we are inducing,
we are currently engaged in indefatigably promoting
exponential and indeeed, more rigorously speaking,
super-exponential, hyperbolic information-processing
growth in our auxiliary intelligent machines with the
aim of bringing about the advent of autonomously
intelligent, ultra- or super-intelligent machines. We
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are, unlike all other non-human Darwin machines
that there have ever been, thereby drastically and
unprecedently modifying, consciously an deliberately
modifying, our biotic and abiotic selection
environment, to render us superfluous, and certainly
to generate beings that surpass us in cognitive
capacity. No other Darwin machine has ever been
known to do this, or even to conceive of it. The
historian of ideas B. Mazlish has long been
advocating the thesis that the the emergence of non-
biological intelligence, approaching the human level
and beyond, involves a discontinuity in the human
self-image so profound, so far-reaching in its range
of implications, as to involve an upheaval
comparable only to the Copernican overthrow of
our central place in the universe, Darwin’s
establishment of our continuity with the animal
kingdom, or Freud’s uncovering, or at least glimpsing,
of the depths of the underworld of human motivation
and mentation52. The general outline of the key blows
that have been struck against anthropocentrism in
the modern world seems plausible, but a few
comments are in order. I am not sure whether the
Freudian discovery would now generally be placed
on a par with the others; there was a time not so
long ago when Marx’s purported unveiling of the
motive-forces of history behind the backs of the
putative agents, would often be ranked with Darwin’s
and Freud’s exposures of fundamental, previously
unknown, truths about human beings (in fact
“Darwin, Marx, Freud” was a trinity of some weight
in Western intelligentsias from at least the thirties
till the sixties, as revealers of the most important
truths about human beings, though only Darwin now
enjoys the kind of ascendancy over the Western
intellect that was once also enjoyed by the other
two, whilst “Marx, Durkheim, Weber” still lingers
as the canonical Founding Fathers triad among
sociologists, probably a legacy of the Cold War,
though for how much longer?53); Nietzsche would
surely be a strong claimant- perhaps the strongest
such claimant- today for a place in this canon of
supreme disabusers and humiliators of man, with
his pitiless exposure of the unwarrantedness, and
radical unwarranteability, of all our epistemic and
moral pretensions, and we may note, finally, that
the last discontinuity in the list alone carries no proper
name (not the least attractive feature of this
revolution…revolutions should not be eponymous).
But whether we are dealing with the third or fourth
or fifth discontinuity of this generic sort, it is no
wonder the cyberintelligentsia claims we must now
be poised on the threshold of trans-humanity, and a
very good thing it is, and not too soon (there will be
no more discontinuities after that, for humans at any
rate, if only because there will be no more humans).
Actually both Dennett and Plotkin, but also many
other scientists and popularizers today, subscribe to
what one might call Darwinian informationalism,
that is to say not just to evolutionary epistemology
of a Darwinian kind, but to computational
Evolutionary Epistemology (ealier versions of
evolutionary epistemology were not so, and it took
three or four decades after the start of the computer
evolution for this programme to be clearly
articulated) not merely as  a grand working
hypothesis, but increasingly as a world outlook in
which the informational-computational construal of
organisms and minds is bound up with strict neo-
Darwinian selectionism or pan-selectionism
(minimizing the importance of “genetic drift” or
“founder effects”, for example, or, more
contentiously, neutral evolution at the molecular
level, a kind of fundamental randomness untempered
by selection, or the contingency of evolution in the
neo-catastrophism of Gould and Eldredge) to
account for all evolutionary processes in organic
and mental life so far and to construct scenarios for
the ascent of intelligent machines into the post-human
condition (the A-fields can also be designated as
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“evolutionary”: “evolutionary computing”,
“evolutionary robotics”, “evolutionary hardware”,
“artificial evolution”, “artificial Darwinism”, etc., are
all locutions to be found in the literature as banners
for research in progress). Already in the emergence
of “evolutionary epistemology”, as a named field of
inquiry a couple of decades ago (in practice of
course is much older, though not always in an
exclusively Darwinian fashion, and went by such
names as “genetic epistemology”, even before
Piaget, whose name is now associated with it, or
“comparative epistemology”, taking into account
phylogenetic and ontogenetic findings), Darwinism,
or  rather neo-Darwinism, as currently understood,
became the template for a master schema of
explanation applicable to any beings endowed with
any kind or degree of cognitive faculty and indeed
throughout  the entire ambit of Popper’s world 3,
the world of the products of the human mind, from
mathematical theorems to musical compositions. In
fact, it has been applied to practically any entities in
any domain of reality, physico-chemical, mental,
social, cultural, material-cultural, technological,
epistemic, as well as biological, in all of Popper’s
three worlds (though pre-eminently in world 3), so
long as they can be encompassed in terms of
variation, replication and selection. Crucially, the
“selection conditions” must be independent
(“decoupled”) from the “variation conditions”, for,
if this crucial constraint is dropped, you get non–
Darwinian, especially “Lamarckian” versions of
evolution54, which today are definitely out of favour,
above all in biology, strictly taboo, strictly
unthinkable, though, according to historians of the
subject, they predominated in the general climate
of Western thought, even after Darwin, until quite
recently, and were important though not hegemonic
even in professional biology for almost a century
after the publication of Darwin’s key book in 1859
if we are to beleve the claims made at conferences
commemorating the centenary of The origin of
species that “a century without Darwin is
enough”55!. Moreover, the schema applies also to
any virtual entities as engendered in computer
simulations, purely within the computer world or
shadowing every existing “natural kind” or type of
entity in any domain of the real world, natural or
cultural, what one might call the “virtuals” (cellular
automata), and merely so, and what one might call
the “virtual somethings” (virtual bacteria, virtual
animals, virtual organisms of any kind, virtual cities,
etc.), that is, the virtual counterparts of entities to
which we have independent access in other ways
than in silico. An important field where curiously
an evolutionary perspective had not been
systematically applied is that of “evolutionary
medicine” which asks Darwinian-kind questions
more focally than ever before regarding diseases
and pathologies (especially in the human case).
Evolutionary perspectives were not paramount
in the earlier versions of the cybernetic world-view,
and there has definitely been a shift towards
evolutionary perspectives in it, not only in the
informationalists’ interest in evolutionary processes
of (natural) life, but in the turn to thinking in
evolutionary terms in all the A-programmes, so much
so that Darwinian selectionism seems inseparable
from any and every project or programme in
Artificial Science or Synthetic Science, though in
fact, in every field of inquiry today claims are
advanced that they exemplify Darwinian change
even without reference to digital modelling and
computational glossing, whether in cosmology with
L. Smolin’s “Darwinism of universes” (the fittest
universes survive, tough the selection mechanism
is somewhat hazy), in the suggestions of a
“microphysical Darwinism”56, and everything in
between, as in the case of neurology, amongst many
other fields that could be mentioned, with the “neural
Darwinism” of Gerald Edelman. The latter,
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inparticualr, could be called a kind of reflexive
Darwinism or recursive Darwinism: each level of
aggregation is accounted for in selectionist terms,
but so is the next level down, that of its constituent
entities, and so on, all the way down. Conversely,
there have been attempts to vindicate Darwinian
explanations of biological evolution by running
computer simulations, to let the “science” or at any
rate the methodology, of Artificial Evolution come
to the aid of the science of natural evolution, with
so many missing links in the fossil record: the case
of the human eye, a notorious difficulty for
Darwinian explanatory hypotheses, does not suggest
that such help may be forthcoming, for  the
experiment cannot, it seems, be credited, but work
in Artificial Evolution or Artificial Darwinism goes
on with undimmed enthusiasm. Note that with the
advent of “evolutionary programming” particularly,
letting virtual change take place in ways not
designed, even unexpected, re-enacting as a precept
the formula “the results of human action, but not of
human design” (the phrase of the eighteenth century
social theorist Adam Ferguson,57 which Hayek has
vindicated as absolutely lapidary, and summing up
one of the key lessons to be learnt from the Scottish
Enlightenment), the now-evolutionary computationalists
are departing from the conventional understanding
of engineering, which stresses conscious design
above all, and seeks to minimize undesigned
consequences, so it is somewhat surprising to see
the constant invocation of engineering as the
paradigm to which respectable cognitive endeavour
should aspire. There is a tension here as throughout
informationalist evolutionism, between the emphasis
on instructions (programs, genetic information) and
on natural selection, despite the conjunction of the
two modes, for some ultra-darwinians woud like to
push the explanatory power and the creative
role of selection (a favourite theme of a major
mathematical theorist of evolutionary biology,
Ronald Fisher, was the “creative role of natural
selection”), as far as possible, iteratively,
consequently minimizing the role of pre-
programming at any time in evolutionary processes
(in some ways a replay of the disputes about the
relative importance in ontogeny of preformation and
epigenesis in biological thought until the late
nineteenth century at least). There seems to be a
kind of tacit variant of a variety of Ockham’s razor
here, one might call the Ockhamite selectionist
rule: never explain the properties of any evolutionary
entity in terms of in-house, pre-existing, wired-in,
information programs, until you have tried your
utmost to explain them as the uphsot of iterated
selection pressures (in the contrast between
“instructional” and “selectional” models, such as
formulated in neuroscience, between models that
depict the explananda as the unfolding of preset
programs, and those that account for the structures
to be explained as the result of iterated selction
pressures on non-programmed entities, the latter are
the favourites). It is not clear how far this
methodological selectionism is to be carried out, and
in any case, it is often applied somewhat selectively,
so to speak.
Dawkins wrote of organisms as “vehicles” for
genes, others have written of bodies as “vehicles”
of brain-information, leading, in their conjoint form,
to what I have called in another paper 58 a “double-
vehicle” view of human beings. On this account,
the organism appears as definitely secondary to both
genes and memes though important as the carrier,
though the essentially transient carrier or material
support for them (the genes at least like
“germplasm” for Weismann, qualifying for
“immortality”): the living, acting, suffering organism
as more than  a vehicular entity, as a device for
holding and transmitting or receiving genes and
memes, as an interactor, as a learner, as a social
being other than as a player of games of strategy, is
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lost from view. Concerned about the passive aura
of the term “vehicle”, the philosopher of biology
David Hull has suggested that we replace this term
in the Dawkins formulation, by “interactor”, to lend
something more like natural agency to the entities
in question, for “vehicle” does suggest utter
subordination and heteronomy, but keeping
“replicator” (the biologist-philosopher M. Ghiselin
has suggested replacing “replicator” by “replicant”,
whose copies are “replicates”). To speak of
interactors and replicators may be an inorovement
over vehicles and replicators, but I am not sure
whether it would not have been preferable to replace
“vehicle” by (natural) “agent” instead of by
“interactor”, for one can interact witout design or
active behaviour, and in any case the interactors in
question, as much as interacting in a wide sense
with the abiotic and biotic environment, in a true
Darwinian spirit, mostly engage in perpetual
competition, in the unceasing struggle for life and
for reproduction against conspecifics, predators,
competitors for scarce resources, so “agonist”
might well have served even better, though no
terminological improvement cannot redeem the
schema from its neglect of energy metabolism, the
thermodynamics of life, on the one hand, and proper
consideration of signs and meanings, of bio-semiosis
and not just bio-informatics, which is misleadingly
collapsed into genetic information only (the
“interactor” as unceasing “interpreter” of signs of
every kind, classifiable in many different ways, as
Peirce brought out)59.
Since genes are the paradigm-case of natural
“replicators”, or information-machines “in the wild”,
as the expression goes, copy-makers par excellence,
by induction at any rate, with the “errors” being
induced by mutations of one sort or another, the
search has been on for counterparts to genes in
other domains, and Dawkins himself suggested
“memes” for the mental (and indeed “inter-mental”,
since they can be passed on from person to person,
horizontally, in an epidemiological-like, non-
reproductive fashion, to kin and non-kin, and that is
really the point, rather than their replication within
the individual psyche) counterpart. “Memetics” has
emerged as a research programme (a degenerate
and degenerating scientific research programme,
some would say) which falls under this rubric,
although much less impressive as yet than the older
A-programmes (AI, AL), and so far with little
practical technological work on offer. It seems to
have been conceived in a fit of amnesia, for a rather
similar programme had already been advanced by
the sociologist-philosopher Tarde a century earlier.
For this thinker, imitation or replication of beliefs
and practices, speech and affect, through custom
or fashion, dogmas and opinions, were the very stuff
of social or as he preferred to call it, inter-mental
life (he was an ontological as well as a
methodological individualist, like Dawkins, one may
presume).
These are only a few examples of the explicit,
currently fashionable variants of “humans as
machines” theories or metaphors. Such theories or
metaphors have been formulated many, many times
before the current cybernetic-informational versions,
which may well be followed by others, as long as
the sciences proceed. Be that as it may, they accord
with the propositional function:
 (M)  “we are (all)____machines [automata]”
“We”= humans, and if humans, also animals (in
fact, all organic beings), where the dash may be
replaced by some classificatory term or other
(simple, mechanical, power, electronic,
computational, finite state machines, etc., Bacon
machines, Darwin machines60, or mixes thereof, or,
elliptically, dropping the explicit term machine or
automaton61, by cyborg, robot, cybot, android, or
cyborg-like, android-like, etc.) according to the
technological epoch, or the conceptual scheme
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favoured by this or that school or this or that
discipline, is one of the most powerful, pervsasive
and addictive  topoi of Western  thought, in science
and philosophy. In the strong version this means “we
are (nothing but) ___machines”, in a weak version
something like “[let us see how far we can learn by
positing that] we are ___machines”, but the strong
version always leads. Kurzweil has written about
“spiritual machines”, but he means nothing like the
conventional understanding of “spiritual” and really
no more than very, very even supremely,
“intelligent”. The “spiritual automaton” of the
seventeenth century was a different matter, an
ensouled automaton, though the similar descriptions
of electric machines, electricity or even aeroplanes,
at least in the air, as more “spiritual” machines than
the earlier ones, quite frequent amongst reflective
engineers and commentators on industrialism when
energy machines (“power machines”) rather than
information machines (“smart machines”) dominated
our imagination, betray the long-standing prepotent
propensity to regard some machines or technological
processes as somehow less mechanical, less
material, than others, or more positively stated, as
deserving the accolade of “intelligent” or even
“spiritual” machines, and engaging to some degree
a variety of “reactive attitudes”62 (such as
admiration, awe, resentment, fear, etc.) we used to
have towards the world of spirit and spirits, perhaps
a version of “technological fetishism” in Adorno’s
sense (who added it to the classical marxist concept
of “commodity fetishism”), engaging another variant
of the “rhetoric of the technological sublime” which
has constantly exalted the conquest of space, time,
matter and nature by machines (in the wide sense
encompassing structures as well as machines in the
narrow sense, and far-flung, large-scale technical
systems like the National Grid, or even the WWW),
their might and potency, their intimations of some
power beyond ourselves, unleashed by us, even
though initially of our own devising. The variable,
placeholder or dash in the propositional function (M)
will no doubt go on being replaced by other modes
of machinehood and the “study of humans”
translated into robotics, androidology, cybergology,
cybotology, etc., or, if you like, of Artificial
Anthropology (AA), that “science of the artificial”
which deals with cybernetic or virtual humans and
humanoids, which I have called elsewhere “ultra-
anthropology”, to which I will add now the
recognition of another cognate “science of the
artificial”,”para-anthropology”63. By “ultra-
anthropology” I mean the study/invention of such
artificial, cybernetic, ratiomorphic beings created by
our info-technologies, at one or more removes, for
evolution is supposed to lend a hand, visible or
invisible, through a sequence of stages of
improvement, which aim not only to attain parity
with, but to surpass and overleap human-level
intelligence. As in the case of exo-biology so far,
the class of such known beings is as yet null, though
not necessarily so, but the subject of very interesting
thought-experiments and indeed actual designed
steps to such an eventual creation. Such proto-
versions as may be designed will be partly left to
the course of evolutionary change, as already tried
out in “evolutionary programming”.
. We can also play, if the pun be allowed, with
the notion that we are or could become, or should
become “pleasure machines”, “experience
machines” (Nozick), or whatever, as analysts of
utilitarianism, in academic prose or dystopias, have
done to accomplish a kind of reductio ad absurdum
of psychological or ethical egoistic hedonism, or
even the ideal of the public well-being in hedonistic
terms, though “paradise engineering”64, the
maximization of hedonic satisfactions through every
technology available (though some that have been
available for decades have not been resorted as
much as one would expect, such as the stimulation
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of the pleasure centers of the brain65 though perhaps
the recently discovered, or at any rate recently
announced “happiness hormone” might catch on)
and yet stay alive, has been seriously proposed
amongst cyberlibertarians66: no longer the “Art of
Living” (as John Stuart Mill put it), but the
engineering or the cybernetics of good living or at
any rate of pleasuring, or at least, as current
exponents of “painism” ( a form of negative
utilitarianism) would have it, of unpaining, of
analgesic engineering, of the complete elimination
of pain, of the capacity to suffer pain, through genetic
engineering if need be, as well as any other pertinent
technology. Yet in the more retarded sections of
humanity no-one would believe that we can dispense
with art or bricolage in these mattters (in fact no
form of real-life engineering implementation can
wholly forego a degree of bricolage, or tacit and
experiential knowledge), or can elude the fortunes
or misfortunes of good or bad “moral luck” (B.
Williams), or, in Sartrean terms, the “facticity” of
our undesigned, unchosen, irrevocable inner or outer
circumstances, which cannot be willed away by any
means whatever, and whose non-recognition is a
source of “bad faith” (recall that Sartre denied the
existence of the unconscious). In any case, it seems
that, whatever the current scientific fashions,
whatever the prevalent machine models may be at
any given time, mechanical, iatromechanical,
energeticist, thermodynamic, hydraulic, electrical,
electromagnetic, electrochemical, biochemical,
atomistic, macromolecular, behaviouristic,
cybernetic, informational, analog, digital, hardware,
software, human beings (and other animate,
sentient, intelligent natural beings) are always
presumed to be subsumable, for scientific purposes,
for the sake of  the “explanation, prediction and
control” of our behaviour, solely and exclusively
under the rubric, or the “root-metaphor” of
machinehood. The question is not so much whether
we are machines or not, or nothing but machines,
for the standing presumption appears to be that we
are indeed nothing else but machines (or, that there
is no fruitful scientific way to proceed but to take
this path, and only this path of inquiry, to the utmost
consequences), but simply what sort of machines.
It seems that in the West, whatever the fashionable
ontological metaphor for mind in any given period,
it must belong to the Great Machine Family, to be
followed by another one, another generation, as it
were, of ontological machine metaphors, once its
proven inadequacies have produced too many
anomalies, or in other circumstances of “paradigm-
change”, to use a fashionable, but deplorable,
terminology, and so on (our ordinary speech, our
folk psychology, still betrays the deposit of figurative
expressions from earlier variants or strata of the
mind-machine ontological metaphor, although for
neuroscience it remains incurably animistic, and thus
to be “eliminated” altogether, to be replaced by the
authoritative, non-animistic, strictly materialist,
scientific picture of our putative minds)67. The
animal-machine motif may have preceded the man-
machine one in Western thought, but today, since
zoophilia is perhaps stronger currently than human
species-philanthropy (concern about the survival of
the species, as distinct from affection for and
benevolence towards particular human beings, or a
subset of human beings, with the future innonimate
generations as the most powerless, and the weakest
in their claims on our consciences) being animals, if
“rational dependent animals” (for the philosopher
A. Mc Intyre) or “moral, believing animals” (for
the sociologist C. Smith68), with an inescapable
moral and spiritual dimension (the vagueness of the
terms does not imply that they are senseless), that
needs to be addresses and not simply bracketed or
subjected to some scientific “universal acid” (as
Dennett famously called Darwinism), would be an
improvement on the exclusive subsumption of human
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beings under one or another variant, past or present,
under the general rubric of machinehood, or as a
determinate occurence of the determinable
“machinehood”.69 Or perhaps, tautologously, but not
irrelevantly, simply humans, albeit humans whose
very being, paradoxically combining the ontic and
the “meontic” (as existentialist thought has adverted,
in Berdyaev, Tillich or Sartre), being and non-being,
solicits the permanent possibility of bestialization,
of “pseudo-speciation” of other human types or
groups, of dehumanization, of self-annihilation, of
the utmost self-deception or “bad faith” (through
mechanization or in some other way) under the guise
of “transcendence” through technological self-
transformation, or through endowing nonhuman,
nonsentient machines with the cognitive capacities
to surpass us, to exceed, and by far, the utmost reach
of natural intelligence, and, so it is argued,  thereby
be fit and ready to take over evolution in our stead.
Though the question of whether physical systems
are all machines, whether quantum phenomena are
both physical and non-machine phenomena, is also
one that is addressed in current discussions, it is
true that, in the main, this type of consideration is
regarded as irrelevant to the issues addressed by
the computational, cybernetic, exponents of machine
intelligence, machine minds, machine consciousness,
of “spiritual machines”70, for, by definition, they have
not given up on the power and the glory of
machinehood.
Notas
1 See the excellent work by Slava Gerovitch From newspeak to
cyberspeak: a history of Soviet cybernetics Cambrige Mass.,
2002. The author refers to cyberspeak as a carnival language,
as an instrument of freedom and as “the universal language of
capitalism and communism”. This most informative work shows
how the technological utopianism associated or reinforced by
the technologies of information and communication and
especially the theoretical vision of cybernetics was not by any
means restricted to the the liberal-capitalist world, but to a
significant extent shared by both worlds, Soviet and American.
2 Leibnitzian binary arithmetic, Boolean algebra, and the Fregean
predicate calculus may be cited. Actually, binarism was
strenuously advocated by the fanatically anti-Aristotelian
Ramus (who exerted a substantial influence throughout the
whole of the Protestant world in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries): a sixteenth century Ramist logician even stipulated
a binary classification of tropes, as comprising basically
metaphor and metonymy, precisely the classification that
Roman Jakobson advocated with such verve in contemporary
semiotics, and which was widely accepted in structuralist
movements in semiotic anthropology and elsewhere, and is
still influential. The whole Ramist approach – a purported
“revolution”, a Reformation of the intellect, supposedly
replacing all of Aristotle (whose intellectual authority led the
poet Donne to call it “the longest tyranny”) - to logic and
rhetoric (still crucial disciplines in university education, as
components of the trivium, the foundation of the lberal arts,
and indeed in colleges also) has been traced to some extent to
the intellectual changes instigated by the “printing revolution”
by W. Ong (a mild form of the mechanization of logic, a blind
alley in the history of logic as it turned out, a failed anti-
Aristotelian revolution, or better, a pseudo-revolution). Binary
arithmetic in Leibniz had theological resonances, and George
Boole, who, it is true, was something of a triadicist, like many
logicians, was in fact an enthusiast for the Holy Trinity, about
which he wrote exalted poems. At the technological level, if
one may draw a sharp distinction between conceptual and
technological anticipations, in as much as Leibniz also invented
reasonably successful arithmetic machines, Ramist logic was
provoked in part perhaps by typographic resources, and if
Boolean algebra of logic did not find a mechanization device
for a long time it eventually proved supremely machineable,
as it were, the following predecessors may be noted. The first
programmed machine arose in connection with the textile
industry, a branhc of production which has been called the
historical laboratory of industrial economies until the early
twentieth century at least, was Jacquard’s loom (Proudhon saw
it as of very great importance for future humane industrialism,
making him almost the first cyber-libertarian, in a broad socio-
political sense, albeit of a very moralistic kind, a diagnostician
of “pornocracy”, a word he invented one hundred almost forty
years ago, but surely more applicable to our own hyper-
mediatized times); the first modern cybernetic industrial
machine (in the sense of being provided with a negative feedback
mechanism) was Watt’s steam engine with a governor (a late
addition to his original steam engine, which underwent a long
series of versions), thereby inaugurating the “control
revolution” of modern industrial economies (though there were
earlier examples of machines with negative feedback controls,
but none enjoyed this kind of worldwide diffusion and range of
applications); the first prototypical computer was Babbage’s
Difference Engine (according to one view, only the inferior
quality of the materials available prevented its realization,
though it may be argued that Babbage did not discriminate
clearly enough between the physical and the mathematical
structure of his proposed machine); the first systematic techno-
economic networking, specifically of transport and
communications, with great emphasis on the very term
“network” (réseau), of such extraordinarily wide diffusion
today, in connection with the newer technologies of
information and communication, was conceived by the Saint-
Simonian engineers of another technological epoch,  inspired
by a planetary and not merely national or simply European,
vision. The word virtual (Latin virtualis) is attributed to Duns
Scotus, and has been in the vocabulary of philosophy and natural
science (mechanics, optics) for centuries. The word clone now
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associated above all, perhaps with genetic engineering first
gained wide currency in the English language in the vocabulary
of computer technology, according to the Oxford Dictionary
of New Words some years ago.
3 Despite the enormous techno-hype of recent decades, the
“cash-value” in macro-economic terms of the ICT
developments is problematical. Between 1950 and the early
1970s productivity increased very rapidly in the US and yet
from the 70s to 1995 there took place a remarkable productivity
slowdown, as yet not satisfactorily explained. Only since 1995
has productivity growth resumed in the US, in a rather sudden,
and suprisingly accelerated fashion (but without matching as
yet the productivity growth rate of the earlier period) and it
may be that, in considerable part, this reflects the delayed
impact of IT and computer-controlled production (the Nobel
Prize-winner economist R. Solow in The New York Review of
Books July 3, 2003, pp. 49-51). More recently it has been
claimed that the productivity pay-off of computerization
computer-mediated communications and cyberneticization in
general is beginning to show in American macro-economic
statistics with a time-lag comparable to that of other
technological revolutions in the post-war period.
4 For Hobbes, the Leviathan was an “Artificial Person”.
5 In effect, the expression “second nature” for the world the
“industrial arts” (in the widest sense) of humans shaped, is as
old as Cicero, that is to say, over two thousand years old.
6 By this term “technoludics” I mean the dreams, imaginative
productions, putative art works involving the ostentatious use
of recent technical devices or their icons, commenting on and
yet dwelling in such technical devices and the technological
world. Technoludics, in the main, has been a Western pursuit,
in contrast to some other cyber technologies during the time
of the USSR. The Pentagon’s seeking counsel from Hollwywood
and Disney regarding their modelling and simulations shows
how serious, how deadly, a business it can be, nevertheless.
7 The appropriation by Marx of the phrase of a forgotten French
writer made it famous. Nevertheless, in addition to the role of
religion (Methodism, particularly, whose role Élie Halévy
emphasised) in narcotizing the masses during the Industrial
Revolution, popular consumption of opiates (especially
laudanum, available legally from pharmacies) was quite
extensive: the opium of the people was opium, as well as
religion. Iin addition, opium and other psychotropic drugs were
tried by English intellectuals during this period, sometimes
leading to addiction (Coleridge, De Quincey), a practice  that
has endured among intellectuals not least oppositional ones in
Continental Europe, even during periods when mass
consumption of opiates, legal or banned, was perhaps
comparatively restricted.
8 It will be recalled that was what Raymond Aron, who wrote a
book with that title, called Marxism, at least among French
intellectuals of the fifties and sixties.
9 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson Metaphors we live by, Chicago
1980.
10 K. Deutsch The nerves of government NY 1968.
11 An overall survey of this process was published some years ago
by the late Heinz Pagels, which would need to be updated in the
light of the developments which have taken place since.
12 In creative mathematics the role of “machine mathematics”
(as Russian scholars called it) and especially of computer-
assisted proofs is still limited: if the four-colour theorem was
finally proved with computer work, the proof of Fermat’s last
theorem was finally done by a human, and indeed through a
process which involved much collaboration with other humans,
relying on recent theorems and branches of matheamtics
developed by humans and humans alone, unaided by computing
devices.
13 Stalin designated writers as “engineers of the soul” (such is the
standard translation of the phrase though presumably Stalin
did not believe in the soul, but I suppose the point is that he
once did) and anyday now similar things will be said if not
about writers, about other “symbol workers” (expression of
the economist R. Reich, formerly a member of the Clinton
administration). In current managerialese, and it is remarkable
how managerialese, as part of market-speak, has been shaping
our vocabulary and even our attitudes, throughout every branch
of life, cultural and educational as well as economic,
“engineering” and “reengineering”, in a pretty metaphorical
sense, appears frequently.
14 By “technocapitalism” is meant a stage of capitalism in which
there takes place a process of ever diminshing reliance on
natural resources (minerals, land, organic inputs) and labour,
and an ever increasing reliance on invention and technological
creativity as the motor of economic growth, exponential
economic growth in which the law of increasing returns prevails
over the Ricardian-style law of diminishing returns (to land,
capital, technology, or other factors), as the master-key to
the origination of new products, processes, and techniques of
economic life in an advanced market economy (v. Luís Suarez-
Villa Invention and the rise of technocapitalism Lanham, MD.,
2000). Some economists go as far as to claim, as R. Solow
famously did in a technical paper, that in principle the economy
could dispense with natural resources. Others invoke a Principle
of Infinite Substitutability whereby, with a few relatively minor
exceptions, technology can substitute any natural, organic or
inorganic input, if allowed full development.
15 Old fashioned neo-liberalism, as exemplified by Hayek, was
often suspicious of engineers, partly no doubt owing to the
engineer-led Technocray movement in the US, extremely
critical of conventional economics, contrasting the alleged
ideal-typical outlook of engineers and their faith in what would
now be called “technical fixes” for everything including the
overhaul of the economy as a machine (the Technocrats
believed that thy could bring about ban economy of abundance
within a few years, without and even against the advice of
economists or businessmen), with that of “merchants”,
businessmen, entrepreneurs (though poles apart in philosophy
and politics, Adorno was also suspicious of the mind-set of
engineers). Hayek wrote at some length in his The counter-
revolution of science.on the engineers trained at the Ecole
Polytechnique refounded by the French Revolution (and who
went on to the more specialized institutions, the École de
Mines, the École des Ponts et Chaussées), above all the Saint-
Simonian engineers, as the carriers of three great ills of the
modern age: sociology, positivism, and socialism. More
recently, the historian of technology Ken Alder has addressed
the formation and role of enginers in France before and during
the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods in a more
comprehensive way, although “engineering the revolution”
seems a far-fetched title in some ways, even if a number of
engineers, engineering students and engineering professors were
enthusiastic supporters of the Revolution, and accordingly
engaged im war-work, and Napoleon was of course an artillery
man (Engineering the Revolution: Arms and Enlightenment
in France, 1773-1815, Princeton 1995). One may hazard the
hypothesis that perhaps all revolutions or, more inclusively,
all the more effervescent phases of new regimes in Europe,
from the French Revolution to the 1980s, whatever the
political ideologies, have provided “windows of opportunity”
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for engineers, especially in terms of major projects, even in
peace-time, in the satisfaction of their material and ideal
interests: the Saint-Simonian engineers were the type-case of
this phenomenon, possessed by a kind of missionary zeal and
religious fervour (in fact many subscribed to the “New
Christianity” of the later Saint-Simon), responsible for scores
of important projects in a multitude of countries and in several
continents, the most famous being, of course, the Suez Canal
(they proposed razing one of the pyramids inherited from
ancient Egypt to allow the construction of a railway, which in
the event, was not a casualty of progress). The first major
type of national engineering schemes were the national railway-
building projects (always of major military importance although
themselves constraining the pursuit of war as in the case of the
Schlieffen Plan). In Portugal, the very interesting, and
unintentionally revealing recent major exhibition “Engenho e
obra” (held in 2003) testifies to the same trendy historiographic
interests as noted in the text. The first engineering schools in
Europe and the Americas were designed for training military
engineers or even part of their War Colleges, and in some
cases, as in France remained under the aegis of the Ministry of
War/ Defence until quite recently, the École Polytechnique of
Paris being a case in point: their relationship to the State was
close from the beginning.
16 P. Bentley Digital biology.
17 Trained at the École des Ponts et Chaussées.
18 The historians of ideas A. O. Lovejoy and George Boas
discriminated sixty-six senses of “nature” in their great
historical survey over fifty years ago, which included classical
as well as medieval and modern European writers (some of
these senses would be correlated with various senses of
“artificial”). Kroeber and Kluchkohn in the 1950s elicited some
one hunded and fifty senses of the word “culture” (some of
which would also be correlated with various senses of the
artificial). But I know of no comprehensive survey of the
historical semantics of the noun/adjective “artificial”, which
would have to encompass writings on the arts, the liberal,
mechanical or fine arts, on aesthetics, as well on technology
and philosophy, but it seems plausible to conjecture, given
these two precedents, that several scores of senses might well
be elicited if such a survey were caried out. In the references in
the text it is clear that any pejorative charge that might have
accrued to some of the earlier usages has vanished. Similarly
the varied senses of “virtual” (a word of Latin origin) in the
history of Western thought and in today’s usages in physics
and other fields of science and technology, deserve a proper
analytical survey. Even Marx after all, drawing a parallel with
D’Alembert’s mechanics where he treated “virtual velocities”,
wrote of “virtual capital” (in a posthumously published part of
Capital).The very helpful, and widely consulted, handbook by
Raymond Williams Keywords - a vocabulary of culture and
society (London 1983) has a useful entry on “Nature”, whose
very first sentence states that this term “is perhaps the most
complex word in the [English] language”, but even the second
edition, dating from 1983, lacks entries on “artificial”, “virtual
(reality)”, “information” or any “cyber-” term, and indeed on
any of the most important words in the informational
constellation, nor do they appear significantly within the
existing entries. This may be due, in part, to the “two cultures”
gap, that his Cambridge colleague famously diagnosed, but
mostly, I suppose, due to culture lag, or the rapid acceleration
of techno-economci change since the late 1970s: still, it is
surprising that these things had not yet impinged so seriously
on the social consciouness of the country, and not even on the
perceptions of a Marxist and cultural materialist as to present
themselves as irrecusable topics for such a lexicon of
contemporary culture.
19 A philosophically-minded British professor of electrical
engineering, Reginald O. Kapp, wrote in 1940: “biologists have
not learnt to distinguish between what the physicist observes
and what he invents, nor to realize how much of his
experimental material has been invented by himself and
manufactured by human effort to his specifications.The
physicist investigates, let us say, pure copper. But pure copper
is not found in Nature. Only copper ores are found and these
have totally different properties. Pure copper is a material
which needs a specification. And it is a specification which
Nature does not follow. The bottles on the shelves of a chemical
laboratory contain substances which someone has specified
and someone has manufactured and which nature does not
produce. The text-book atom is but another example of one of
the things which meets a specification devised by the physicist,
not by Nature. /But the biologist hardly realizes this because
his own methods are so different. He does, for the greater part
of his time, investigate and describe what he has found and not
he has invented. His observational material is manufactured
for him by Nature” (R.O. Kapp, Science versus materialism,
London, 1940, p. 71). Since then, as we all know, things have
changed drastically as far as much biology is concerned, the
biologists have learnt their lesson only too well, their physics
envy being much mitigated. Indeed molecular biologists have
embraced physics by designating molecular genetics as the means
whereby biology, will be reduced, in principle at any rate, in
one or another sense of “reduction”, to physics or physics-
chemistry, to macromolecular physics most immediately. The
kinds of reductions (normally understood as micro-reductions)
of one science to another, or one branch of science to another,
that may be accomplished or aimed at (even if not successful)
in the life sciences are various, and  five different kinds at least
have been discriminated in the literature (Sahotra Sarkar
Genetics and reductionism, Cambridge 1998).
20 M. Minsky on the brain as “meatware”.
21 The famous terms of Lévi-Strauss.
22 Hayek drew a classical distinction between “prediction in detail”
and “prediction in principle”. This is somewhat analogous to
that drawn by Hempel between “explanation sketches” and
“full explanations” of the deductive-nomological kind, though
in the latter case it seems a continuum was involved rather a
dichotomy, and Hayek would not have susbcribed to the
Hempelian teaching of the logical symmetry of scientific
explanation and scientific prediction (and of prediction and
retrodiction), which implies that if you can explain you can
predict, and vice-versa, and in equal measure, though often
scientific explanations are forthcoming without comparable
predictive power, as in Darwinian accounts of evolution, or
you can predict without the proper explanations (at any rate
of a deductive-nomological kind) to warrant the predictions,
as in “black box” types of prediction (for a congruent claim
see the reference to S. Wolfram; domains where determinstic
chaos matters are cases in point, inasmuch as, being
deterministic, they yet afford low predictability). A “prediction
in principle” merely outlines the over-all pattern of key
phenomena to be expected from a given policy or “exogenous
shock”, without the kind of quantitative specification of the
results of policies or the impact of events, which are very
often possible in the physical sciences, and which has been
aimed at, so far with only modest success, by econometrics.
Hayek, of course like, other “Austrians” (and in this point, if
nothing else, converging with Keynes) was very critical of the
aims and ambitions of econometrics.Though genetics in recent
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years has ranked its predictive powers rather high, in fact, a
behavioural trait, strictly speaking, should be called genetic if
and only if genes, and genes alone, provide the best explanation
for it, whereas it is the case that most complex behavioral
traits in the case of human beings cannot be accounted for in
this stringent  fashion (S. Sarkar, op.cit.). But then, where
genetics is, there loose talk for public consumption abounds.
Curiously, although a standard formula, indeed a kind of mantra,
of positivist philosophy of science was always that science
ains at “prediction and control”, one rarely finds in textbooks
of the philosophy of science much explication of “control”,
or much systematic discussion of control as a critical issue in
the philosophy of science, and the relationship between control
and prediction (except in minor senses like “controlled
experiment”, or “statistical controls”).
23 Ray Kurzweil, one of the the most important of cyberprophets
today, has commented at some length on the Wolfram project.
24 The reference is to Francis Bacon, the “prophet of industrial
science” and author of doctrines of scientific method which
have been highly controversial, condemned by the Popperians
as crass inductivism, but pretty thoroughly rehabilitated in
some post-Popperian quarters and elsewhere, as we can see
from the very name given to these inductive reasoning programs
25 Popper used to begin his lectures to undergraduates on scientific
method at LSE (which I attended) by emphasising that scientific
method or methods are not at all like sausage machines (sensory
input, cognitive output). The methodological, “intelligent”
sausage machines have arrived, at least in metascience
simulation, in the rational reconstruction ex post of the
production of knowledge. And the tacit expectation that we
can rely on one kind or another of algorithmic procedure as
the functional equivalent of that sausage machine dies hard.
26 Ross D. King  and seven other authors “Functional genomic
hypothesis generation and experimentation by a robot
scientist”, Nature 15 January 2004, pp.247-252.
27 Cf. my paper “The marketisation of the universities “
Metacrítica no. 3, 2003.
28 I understand that courses on the philosophy of technology
used to be taught in many Schools of Engineering in the USA:
on the whole, it does seem to have been a waste of time.
29 Ruddy Rucker Mind tools – the mathematics of information
London 1987.
30  Jeffrey Satinover The quantum brain- the search for freedom
and the next generation of man, New York, 2001, p. 137 and
p. 111. The notion of “ontological metaphor” was advanced
by the linguist George Lakoff in collaboration with the
philosopher Mark Johnson in their Metaphors we live by,
Chicago 1980.
31 The notions of “floods of information” threatening to “engulf”
or “swamp” us, of a “sea of information” surrounding us, of
the need to “navigate”, or “surf”, or “swim” in the “sea” or
“ocean” of information, and indeed the very etymology of the
word “cybernetics” (cybernetes), of steering a ship, or the
helmsman, warrants these images, have accompanied the ascent
of the informational galaxy from 1945 more or less, Some
appeared originally in the context of the first cybernetics of
Wiener et al., through the Cold War when these metaphors
became politicized and even militiarized, and went on to
redeployment in the widely read science fiction of William
Gibson which has also been much filmed (Mark D. Bowles
“Liquifying information: controlling the flood in the Cold
War and beyond” in Miriam R. Levin “Cultures of control“
Amsterdam 2000).
32 We are not going to engage in this paper with this influential
account of matter-theory. Many others have done so.
33 An outlook shared by Leibniz and Spinoza, and perhaps Locke
as well.
34 There is a very useful collection of the classic papers in this
field under the title Maxwell’s demon.
35 There is a technical question here which may be adverted
briefly. Kant contradistinguished the forms of sensibility ie
space and time, from the categories of the understanding
(causality, finality, substance, etc.). Renouvier regarded this
distinction as untenable, as indeed he regarde the trichotomy
of sensibility-understanding-reason and the notion of the
noumenon associated with this trichotomy as a colossal error
and the key source of the great metaphysical explosion of
systems of Absolute Idealism that ensued. Hence his categories
of thought included the Kantian forms of sense-intuition, space
and time, as well as the Kantian categories of the understanding
proper.
36 Like “ideology” (a wide category) for Althusser, and perhaps
for Marx.
37 Here “Collingwood” may stand for a whole array of
propounders of similar theses, most of them far better known,
but not necessarily superior in the appeal of their visions, the
cogency of their arguments or the lucidity of their expositions
(a discussion of these theses, complementing the present paper,
will be published elsewhere)  .
38 N. Rescher, Essays in philosophical analysis and Nature and
understanding NY 2001. The legitimacy, historic role, and
indeed the very existence, of evaluative metaphysics, should
be more widely appreciated. Failure to do so is a source of
many misunderstandings concerning the scope of metaphysical
inquiry and reflection. It is to be hoped that enlightenment on
these matters may proceed.
39 Paul Churchland is a leading exponent of this perspective.
40 In Davidson’s “token identity” theory, mental states and brain
states are deemed to be identical, and yet, becausew they are
only token-identical (particular to particular), the
“anomalousness of the mental” obtains, and thus no laws which
could enable us to predict mental states from brain states in the
Hempelian fashion (hence the locution “anomalous monism”
to designate his position). This is one of the most widely
referred positions in contemporary philosophy of mind. If the
sociocultural supervenes on the psychological in an analogous
fashion, we could identify social facs with states of minds,
without thereby commiiting ourselves to the claim that there
are bridge laws that would enable us to predict nomologically
social states of affairs from knowledge of the minds of
individuals.
41 A spirited contemporary defender of “emergent materialism”
(which could also be called “emergent mentalism”, for, according
to this view, mental life emerges from organic life, but is not
reducible to it without remainder, and has its own laws) is the
prolific exponent of “exact philosophy” (using the tools of
logic and mathematics to secure precision in philosophy, as
well as reliance on substantive scientific findings), Mario Bunge,
a former physicist. Of course there are other forms of
purportedly nonreductive philosophical/scientific materialism
in connection with “supervenience” theses, widely discussed in
the last decade or so.
42 D. H. Reuben The metaphysics of the social world, Byron
Kaldis Holism, language and persons. J. Margolis defends a
form of generalized emergent materialism, in that culture itsef
is designated as an emergent level of reality, not reducible to
individual psychology (psychologism) or the actions of
individuals.
43 A very interesting statement of “relational realism” appears in
H. Alpert’s 1939 book on Durkheim in his explication and
purification of Durkheim´s social holism.
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44 Renouvier was the first and remained almost alone, save for
his disciples like the dialectical idealist Hamelin, in including
the category of the person in his table of categories (which
started with the category of relation and culminated in the
category of the person). Durkheim followed him in this
“categorialization” of the person, and Mauss eventually
published a rather schematic paper on the category of the
person (the subject of a collection of anthropological papers
some years ago). In more recent philosophy, Nicolai Hartmann,
who wrote extensively on category theory, included
“personality” as a category of the realm of “spiritual being”.
45 Scientists like E. O. Wilson sometimes write of “the mythology
of scientific materialism”, not to dissociate themselves from
its truth (or its purport as the whole truth, and the only truth),
as might be naively thought, but not to scare us too much.
46 “Stripping away the veils” was a metaphor for this final
disclosure of underlying ugly reality, used for many decades by
and about major thinkers, like Marx and Freud, and other
important or very infleuential scholars well into the twentieth
century,  but now seems to have faded away. Perhaps Virtual
Reality has struck the final blow against this particular metaphor.
47 There is a classic paper by the sociologist Peter Berger on the
obsolescence of the concept of honour in contemporary
Western societies (some have claimed that shame is going
too), leaving open the possibility that we might still legitimately
claim dignity and demand to be treated accordingly. These
movements of thought proclaim the obsolescence of the
concept of dignity (B. Skinner Beyond freedom and dignity).
They may be right, although somehow we cling to it, as the
last claim of the defeated, the conquered.
48 The often been castigated as sexist, masculinist, androcentric,
patriarchal, phallocratic in ideological motivation or affinity.
However, the founder of behaviourism, John B. Watson,
curiously referred to psychology according to the feminine
gender, unusual at the time, and even now. With Haraway we
now have a clear-cut version of machine feminism, and thus at
least one version of the machine theory of humans, more
specifically of mechanizing humans into the post-human era,
is, therefore, OK: no problem!
49 Trivially, it is true of course that many of us would qualify to
some extent for incipient cyborg status by virtue of a great
variety of temporary exosomatic or in-body (but externally
produced and maintained) prostheses such as glasses, hearing
aids, artificial limbs, false teeth, pacemakers, breast or penile
implants, etc. Microchips of the sort that is meant to control
the nervous system and brain function and to couple the person
to other microelectronic external devices, or microchipped
human or non-human beings, would seem to place us on a
higher level of cyborgification (though domestic pets are
increasingly microchipped instead of conventionally tagged,
especially for cross-national travel within the EU, or for
humbler purposes). None of this qualifies us in any substantial
degree, as yet, for the mission for which cyborgs were originally
designed, space travel, space migration and extra-terrestrial
residence. On the other hand, a number of animal-obsessed
people in the US and some other Western countries have gone
and are going now to extreme lengths, undergoing repeated
operations, sometimes painful, and dangerous surgery and other
procedures, to accomplish “extreme body modification”, often
quite extensive, spending good money in the process, not for
therapeutic or religious reasons, but in order to become more
obviously animal-like, at least phenotypically, resembling in
important features some animal species or other (more like
leopards, or  cats, or even serpent-like by forking their tongues,
etc.). The pull of the living animals, of zoomorphy, to the
extent of reshaping our bodies to mimic them, is generally
regarded as aberrant, or even disgusting (some of these
procedures, it is true, can be justified in terms of greater human
satisfactions, especially sexual ones, but this kind of
instrumental, straightforwardly hedonic justification does not
appear to be the prevalent one, and certainly not the exclusive
one, among human zoomorphs). At any rate, these people
appear to ignore the call of cyborgification and go the other
way so to speak. Yet the pull of the mechanical, the lure of
becoming more like machines, of becoming cyborgified or
robotized, is seen as a higher calling than zoomorphy, if indeed
not our highest calling, our post-zoological, post-biological,
mechanical post-human destiny. The favoured imperative or
hortative is clearly “become cyborgs”! Those who feel
misgivings about this injunction can then be told “we are already
cyborgs anyway, so what’s the problem?” The most obdurate
will be told “alright, if you insist, we will concede, for the sake
of argument, that we are not all cyborgs yet, in every way, or
it may not show very much yet, but we will all become cyborgs
anyway, sooner than you think, no matter what you do or feel:
my advice is, as the saying goes, if you can’t beat them, join
them!”. These three moves exemplify a very general pattern
of argumentation in all forms of technophiliac discourse, a
typical schema of techno-persuasion.
50 John Dewey Experience and Nature N.Y., 1929, p. 301.
51 No prizes for guessing that the allusion is to Donna Haraway as
siren singer nonpareil in these matters.
52 Bruce Mazlish. Regarding the Copernican revolution, in some
ways the new astronomy improved things for man, for the
central place in the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic universe was by no
means seen as a wholly positive, but also as a negative privilege,
being especially corrupt: turned into an ordinary place like any
other, with nothing special about it, no special spatial location,
the abode of human beings, the theatre of the salvation story
lost this awfulness, though it may have gained other disabilities,
like cosmic insignificance in non-religious respects.
53 It is widely asserted that no science (outside mathematics and
physics) which fails to claim Darwin as a supreme inspiration
can be taken very seriously. At any rate, there have been recent
further attempts to re-Darwinize sociology from within
(something which has been tried again and again “ever since
Darwin”, without yielding a substantial corpus of cumulative
knowledge), as yet with little impact on this very, very
conservative discipline (which is not to say that some proposed
or realized extensions of Darwinism, sociobiology or
evolutionary psychology to the social sciences are particularly
helpful).
54 A helpful analysis by Rescher on this score
55 Timothy Shanahan The evolution of Darwinism –Selection,
adaptation,and progress in evolutionary biology Cambridge
2004.
56 David Bohm, in his treatise of quantum mechanics written
before he became a Bohmian, so to speak, dissenting from the
orthodoxy and becoming a major if not indeed the major gadfly
in the field for many years, has a passage of great interest in
this context: “in many ways, the concept of a virtual transition
[in quantum theory], resembles the idea of evolution in biology,
where all kinds of species can appear as a result of mutations,
but only certain species can survive indefinitely, namely, those
satisfying certain requirements for survival in the specific
environment  surrounding the species” (Quantum theory,
London, 1951, p. 414). “Virtual transitions” are of course
prodigiously numerous in the microworld, perhaps by virtue of
a kind of a “principle of superfecundity”, comparable to that
The Metaphysics of Information
191RES-PUBLICA
borrowed by Darwin and Wallace from Malthus, but only some
are entities have staying power to be realized in actuality. The
Darwin-Wallace-Malthus schema thus appears as an “ordinally
neutral” principle that holds good of every level of reality,
from the deepest to the most inclusive, from the microworld
to the entire cosmos. Of course, if biological mutations are due
to quantum effects there are substantive, causal links as well as
formal analogies between the quantum realm and the realm of
biospecies evolution. The formal analogies would warrant the
expression “ordinally neutral law” (the term “ordinally neutral”
is due to C. D. Broad in his The mind and its place in nature
devised to apply to laws or mechanisms that operate
isomorphically at different, “emergent”, levels of reality). It
is intriguing that some physicists have even written of
“selectors” in their discussions of the perplexities generated in
quantum theory (E. Squires). A Darwinian-informationalist view
of the microphysical world has not yet appeared in very explicit
fashion, at any rate as put forward by physicists, though there
are hints elsewhere, and it would not be too difficult to draw ou
of recent writings: if matter at the quantum level is information
and if, as Bohm suggested, a kind of Darwinian schema is
applicable to the quantum world, the conjunction of these
threses wold yield a Darwinian-informationalist picture.
57 An essay on civil society (1762).
58 “Goodbye body” (manuscript in the possession of the author).
59 On biosemiosis the writings of Jasper Hoffmeyer are particularly
illuminating.
60 The biologist T. H. Huxley, “Darwin’s bulldog”, professed the
“automata theory” (as he called it) of the mind, and indeed
defended epiphenomenalism (the view that mental events have
causes, but have no effects, either with respect to other mental
events or to any non-mental ones, a very widespread view in
the second half of the nineteenth century), with brio: we are
automata, as the Cartesians claimed non-human animals were,
and that’s that. But I don’t recall that he linked this stance to
his Darwinian evolutionist convictions, though presumably he
believed at least that they were mutually consistent, and even,
possibly, mutually supporting. “Automata Darwinism” , the
conjunction of the automata theory regarding organisms and
biological Darwinism, is today de rigueur, reinforced by the
extreme geneticization of the organism, and the computational
theory of mind, though it is not clear that Darwinism entails
the automata theory regarding organisms, and surely the
automata theory of organisms in general, and of animals in
particular, does not entail Darwinism (a theological version of
animals as full-fledged natural automata flourished before, in
Cartesian thought through Malebranche and after, just as the
mechanical natural philosophy of Boyle was theologically
inspired).
61 The Greek term “automaton”, incorporated the word “mat“
which is an Indo-European root, which appears in such words
as mens, mind, mente (respectively Latin, English, Portuguese)
and their cognates. Automata are referred to in the Iliad.
62 Strawson’s expression.I call “para-anthropology“: the study
of such artificial cybernetic beings devised  in similar fashion
(robots) which are purposely designed to operate below the
human level of intelligence, though perhaps the equal of
humans (“workalikes”), or surpassing, humans in specific motor
or other functions (but not necessarily “lookalikes”, i.e.,
looking like us, with or without extreme body modification).
This class has many actual members, abandoned or scrapped as
well as operational, and indeed a large and increasing population.
Such robots (not necessarily humanoid in appearance) have
been designed, or are being designed, to act as helpers,
paramedics, warriors, aviators, workers, even “maids”
(“maids”? - Donna Haraway, where are you when we need
you?). The Republic of Korea is making considerable
investments on the development of military robots to replace,
as much as to supplement, human soldiers, as doubtless the US
is too, in the drive towards the ever more intelligent batlefield
and the ever more informatized, casualty-minimizing, sure-
win war over any enemy. The reference to “maids” is not made
up: it appears in the work Robo sapiens. I have already referred
to Artificial Ethology which could also be called Artificial, or
Robotic, Zoology, the design of animal-simulating (functionally,
if not necessarily morphologically or phenotypically), robots.
64 Accessible through the Internet.
65 In work done by the neurologist James Olds three decades ago.
Rats that got addicted to pleasure centre stimulation died
through failure to meet other life-needs, like food or water-
intake, after short lives of pure bliss, such as probably no
animal had ever experienced in the whole history of the realm
before neuroscience came along (others managed not to get
addicted, and took their exceptionally intense pleasures with
moderation). I cannot imagine that a sophisticated, updated,
larger-scale version of these experiments in fatal bliss addiction
will not be tried out someday, whether on rats or on other
“living automata” (on some species or population or other).
Perhaps not by humans on animals or other humans or even
themselves (“pleasure machines” to the highest degree). But
conceivably it might be tried out by the Super-Intelligences
which many trans-humanists expect and indeed fervently hope
will arrive, at the current rate of advance in Artificial
Intelligence and allied fields, some time between the years
2020 and 2050, for whom perhaps the most immediate target
species may well be homo sapiens sapiens (not the worst way
to go, perhaps, as forms of  species-euthanasia, of species-
wide mercy killing, go: most species-extinctions, including
hominid ones, have been brought about in unrelieved terror,
agony, desolation). After all, trans-humanists refer to the
passage to Super-intelligences as the “Rapture”. Perhaps
something like this has already been depicted in some movie
or other.
66 You can look up the topic, or at least the phrase, in the
Internet.
67 It is curious that all the sentences that Lakoff and Johnson in
their book on metaphors, published in 1980, list to illustrate
the theme “the mind is a machine” bear the imprint of the
Steam Machine Age (such as “running out of steam”) or the
Automobile Age (“the wheels are turning now”, “I am a little
rusty today”). If they were writing today presumably they
would have added conversational locutions of the Computer
Age to illustrate the current folk-embedding of the master-
metaphor of “the mind is (like a) machine”, such as “give
more input”, “being hard-wired for”, “data base”,  “reboot”,
“run a new program”, etc. Their general characterization of
seven marks present in all such instances of the mind-as-
machine topos is still rather instructive : “a conception of the
mind as having an on-off state, a level of efficiency, a productive
capacity, an internal mechanism, a source of energy, and an
operating condition” (p. 28). The “on-off state” is even more
salient with our utter reliance on binary digits, though one
learnt this as much from the taken-for-grantedness of ubiquitous
on-off electric switches as from anything else, though ordinary
acess to electricity supply need not have assumed this almost
universal digital character (there were analog devices). In a
later work, published in 1987, Lakoff addressed at some length
the computational theory/metaphor of mind.To be sure, in
ordinary language we also use other metaphors for mind such
as “the mind as a britle object”, which is surprisingly common,
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as they note. That is to say, it would seem licit to hypothesize
that in the West, in our commonsensical mind-talk, we are not
generally possessed by a single master metaphor for the mind,
but resort to a variety of machine metaphors without
commitment to or even perhaps belief in any kind in particular
(metaphors can surely be deployed in a non-doxastic mode), as
we dwell in the “paramount reality of everyday life” (Schutz).
68 One swallow does not make a summer, but the fact that an
American sociologist has felt it necessary to write a book,
even qua sociologist, in which the concerns of philosophical
anthropology are paramount, and get it published by Oxford
University Press, is definitely a good sign.
69 Someone once objected to an ancestral version of this paper in
one short, sharp sentence; “We are all copies!” .The context
was my discussion of the obsession with the Perfect Copy,
which obviously irritated this member of the audience. I was
reminded of an English poet’s verses, written, it should be
noted, in the eighteenth century: “How come that we are all
born originals/ and yet we all become copies?”(Edward Young
“Night thoughts”). With human reproductive cloning it might
become true that many of us would not become copies, but
would be born copies, by design, not by accident. Perhaps
never quite perfect copies, as suggested by the Fordist model in
Huxley’s dystopia, but it is till curious that in an age that
boasts of having left Fordism behind in industrial production
and turned to a variety of Post-Fordist models of production
and work organization, we are going into reproductive Fordism
as the dernier cri of the newer reproductive technologies. The
raw material of Evolution in the world of (natrual) life-forms
has been precisely inter-individual differences, as revealed in
phenotypes.Without inter-individual differences, maximized
through sexual reproduction, no evolution, as we have known
it. Evolutionary biologists have taught us about the key role of
sexual reproduction in speeding-up evolution but now asexual
reproduction, cloning, is on the agenda, but it it is not clear
that biologits have in mind now, perhaps as a kindness, the
deceleration of evolution as a a goal. Still, I am sure the speaker
did not have in mind the Timaic cosmology in which everything
is a copy of a timeless, logically and ontologically prior model.
70 I have written on these matters of the dreams and projects of
the ascent of “spiritual machines” in “Aceleração, tecnogénese
e experimentum humanum” in the book I edited with José Luís
Garcia and the colaboration of Helena Jeónimo Dilemas da
civilização tecnológica, Lisboa, Imprensa das Ciências Sociais,
2003, pp. 19-77, and in “Tecnociência e arte” in Carlos Leone
(ed.) Rumo ao cibermundo, Oeiras, Celta 2000.
